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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
The past decade has dramatically shaped the European economic landscape. After the global 
financial and economic crisis of 2008/09 hit the continent, the southern European periphery 
exemplified by Greece experienced a strongly diverging economic development. As capital 
inflows from the North dried up, the highly indebted southern euro countries running large 
current account deficits provoked fears of contagious sovereign defaults. The EU responded to 
the subsequently escalating ‘euro crisis’ with a series of institutional adjustments including the 
hitherto unwanted bail-out opportunities for individual member states. While these reforms 
were meant to strengthen supra-national capacities and cohesion, in 2016, UK citizens rather 
decided to exit the EU as the first country in history and being one of its economically powerful 
member states in the North. However, the corresponding heated debates about ‘Grexit’ and 
‘Brexit’ on opposite sides of Europe also reflected the rising overall skepticism about the 
benefits from economic and monetary integration. Similar discussions across EU member states 
in fact created the impression that the European unification sooner or later might drift apart.  
Against this backdrop, the question of economic convergence or divergence within the 
European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) came back into political and academic focus. 
It is of key importance, as in the absence of economic homogeneity, particularly between the 
so-called ‘core’ and the ‘peripheral’ countries, any supranational policy will most likely 
continue to favor some countries at the expense of others, thereby giving rise to political 
disruption and nationalist tendencies. The present dissertation is an attempt to highlight some 
of the underlying group-dynamic con- and divergences in macroeconomic developments within 
the EMU in order to provide data-based guidance for national and European policy makers. To 
understand the root causes of the current situation and the choice of economic indicators, 
however, some historical developments have to be set in context first. 
Over the past quarter century, the EU has substantially extended both its membership and the 
policy fields, over which it is responsible. From the original EU-12 when the Maastricht Treaty 
came into force in 1993, the Union expanded into the North in 1995 and over the 12 mainly 
Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) in 2004 and 2007. Finally, Croatia has been 
welcomed as its newest and 28th member state in 2013. At the same time, more and more 
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formerly national competences have been shifted towards the supranational level, with the 
establishment of the EMU being the most prominent and far-reaching unification so far 
including the single monetary policy of 19 euro area (EA) members under the head of the 
European Central Bank (ECB). According to applied legislation, all EU member states should 
at some point in the future adopt the Euro as the common European currency1 so that a fully 
integrated internal market of about 500 million European citizens can unfold its full potential.  
Although the aim of this unique integration project has ever been economic convergence and 
overall prosperity,2 the rapid simultaneous expansion and deepening processes have brought 
about substantial  economic and political discrepancies, most evidently regarding the monetary 
integration of the southern and eastern European ‘peripheries’ and the ‘core’ countries in the 
North.3 While the prospects of a single monetary union had been heavily debated within the 
latter country group4 and beyond,5 among the southern weak currency countries, the belief in 
the benefits of a common currency prevailed. The hope was to profit from greater stability and 
lower interest rates that facilitate investing and overall catching-up to the core countries once 
national currencies were abandoned.  
Growing imbalances between the original EA-12  
In fact, when the Euro was introduced as the third step of EMU in 1999, the GIIPS countries 
had already benefitted from the associated decline in long-term interest rates (Figure 1). From 
                                                          
1 Exceptions are Denmark and the UK, who negotiated an opt-out of the monetary integration. In fact, 
as has been done by Sweden, the otherwise mandatory euro introduction can also be postponed rather 
artificially by not fulfilling the conditions of membership set out in the Maastricht Treaty.  
2 These goals were proclaimed in the preambles of the Treaties on European Union and the Functioning 
of European Union.  
3 Although the present dissertation attempts to define each countries’ belongingness to these groups 
more specifically, for reasons of simplicity, the remainder of this introduction refers to those selected 
EU member states that have been most commonly used in the literature to represent the core and the 
peripheries. Accordingly, Figures 1 to 4 display the development of Germany representing the supposed 
core countries in Central Europe. While the eastern periphery is represented by the EU-8 accession 
countries (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) among 
the CEECs, the southern periphery is summarized together with Ireland as the GIIPS countries (Greece, 
Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain) or GIPS without Italy. However, it should be noted that there is still 
remarkable heterogeneity within these groups, which is discussed more closely in the next chapters. 
4 While French and German political leaders promoted Europe’s monetary integration for political 
reasons, British and Danish politicians decided against such a loss of national sovereignty. Nonetheless, 
many German economists publicly warned against the too early inception of the Euro for manifold 
economic reasons (see Ohr and Schäfer (1992) and Kösters et al. (1998) for two manifests against the 
EMU resolutions). 
5 Jonung and Drea (2010) offer an overview of American economists’ views on the prospects of EMU. 
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the high levels of the early 90s, those countries’ long-run interest rates converged to the same 
low levels of the core countries, indicating that henceforth no individual country risks were 
seen for any EA member state. Remarkably, this was despite the no-bail-out legislation that had 
been put in place in the Maastricht Treaty, but did not possess the necessary credibility to ensure 
continuity of country-specific risk premia. 
Figure 1: Long-term interest rates of selected EU countries 
 
Notes: Eurostat data, monthly long-term government bond interest rates, 
own representation.  
With decreasing costs of borrowing and rising private sector debt-to-GDP ratios (Figure 2), 
capital started to flow from the core countries mainly into the GIIPS countries’ non-tradable 
sector, causing the demand-driven economic boom of the early 2000s visible in Figure 3. 
Although this was perceived in line with the expected real catching-up (Blanchard and Giavazzi 
2002), in fact little had been invested to repay the borrowed capital in the future. Instead, the 
cheap credits were largely used to finance public and private sector consumption (Baldwin et 
al. 2015). At the same time, wages and prices increased to uncompetitive levels compared with 
the North that were not justified by an equivalent rise in productivity. While nominal unit labor 
costs climbed up accordingly, imports increased and exports were restrained in the South. As 
seen in Figure 4, this led to substantial competitiveness and current account imbalances between 
the core and the southern periphery, which could no longer be resolved by an exchange rate 
mechanism.6  
                                                          
6 See, for instance, Jaumotte and Sodsriwiboon (2010), Chen et al. (2012), Frankel (2015), Kang and 
Shambaugh (2016), and Baldwin et al. (2015) who provide a conclusive view of many leading 
economists on the rising imbalances and their impacts within the EA. 
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Figure 2: Public and private sector indebtedness in the EU 
 
Notes: Eurostat data, consolidated government and private sector debt 
levels in percent of GDP, country group averages, own representation. 
Figure 3: Real GDP growth rates of selected EU countries 
 
Notes: Eurostat data, annual real GDP growth rates, own representation.  
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Figure 4: Current account balances and unit labor costs of selected EU countries 
 
Notes: Eurostat data, annual current account balances in percent of GDP 
and annual growth rate of nominal unit labor costs, country group averages, 
own representation.  
The impact of the global financial and economic crisis 2008/09 and the euro crisis  
With the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2007, the situation worsened dramatically, as 
price bubbles especially in the Irish and Spanish real estate market burst and led to bank defaults 
and state rescue measures. Across European economies, extensive economic programs were 
put in place to fight the subsequent deep global recession of 2008/09 and avoid system-relevant 
bankruptcies, which drastically increased government debt levels from 2008 onwards. Figure 2 
illustrates that not only did overall public indebtedness increase in every direction, but also the 
deviations between the core and the peripheries widened. After Greece had declared its real 
fiscal deficits in late 2009, the acute crisis of the EA then broke out as capital flows came to a 
sudden halt and investors started again to impose risk premia on countries that were considered 
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to be on a similarly unsustainable path and prone to contagion (Baldwin et al. 2015). As seen 
in Figure 1, the interest rates on long-term government bonds spread again, pushing the 
recapitalization costs of the GIIPS countries to extremely high levels. Consequently, these 
countries were threatened by government default in an already recessionary and deflationary 
situation marked by low external competitiveness, heavily indebted banks, high unemployment, 
and no individual exchange rate policy at hand. What is often labelled the European government 
debt crisis (Lane 2012), can thus also be seen in a broader perspective as mutually reinforcing 
banking-, debt-, and growth crises fundamentally linked with the construction of the EA and 
the unfolding of earlier imbalances (Shambaugh 2012; Frankel 2015; Eichengreen 2015). This 
was reflected in the growth rates of real GDP as the GIIPS countries, in contrast to the core, 
experienced another prolonged downturn after the immediate slump of 2008/09 (Figure 3). 
Hence, to reverse the lingering discrepancies in competitiveness and growth, structural reforms, 
internal devaluations (Tressel et al. 2014; Salvatore 2015), and austerity in the GIIPS countries 
(Feldstein 2015), but also other options like the Greece exit from the EA (‘Grexit’) or even a 
breakup of the EA (Eichengreen 2010) were intensively debated. On the other hand, the Eastern 
periphery did experience a quite similar development of high current account deficits, unit labor 
costs growth, private sector debt accumulation through large capital inflows, and sustained 
demand-driven growth over the first decade of the Euro (Figures 1 to 4). However, while 
maintaining individual exchange rates, these countries overcame the partly severe recession 
impacts remarkably fast.7  
Supra-national policy response and adjustment 
This ‘euro crisis’ put the ECB in front of immediate challenges in terms of financial stability 
and the survival of the Euro, as well as the permanent dilemma of finding an optimal ‘one-size-
fits-all’ monetary policy for the whole EA, which has been divided into the struggling southern 
periphery and the faster recovering countries in the North and East (Figure 3). In 2012, while 
already conducting an expansive monetary policy in favor of the southern periphery, the ECB 
President Mario Draghi claimed to ‘do whatever it takes to preserve the Euro.’ In reaction to 
his pledge and the respectively announced ‘outright monetary transactions’ program, indeed, 
the spread in government bond yields started to decrease again without any real intervention 
                                                          
7 Slovenia first introduced the Euro in 2007 and was followed by Slovakia in 2009, Estonia in 2011, 
Latvia in 2014 and finally Lithuania in 2015. Bakker and Klingen (2012) provide a comprehensive 
analysis of the pre- and post-crisis developments in the CEECs. 
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(Figure 1). Nonetheless, as the standard mechanism had been exhausted at the zero lower 
bound, the ECB subsequently followed other central banks in adopting unconventional 
monetary policies for the EA.8 Additionally, the EU introduced a body of policy measures and 
new governance tools (financial aid packages, European Stability Mechanism, ‘Six Pack’ 
measures, European Semester, Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), Fiscal Compact, 
European banking union, Juncker Plan, among others) aimed at supporting the southern 
periphery as well as resolving the current and preventing future crises.9  
The fiscal bail-outs and the unconventional monetary policy of recent years, however, have 
provoked a lot of criticism primarily on the side of the core countries. Besides the discussions 
about the central bank’s capacity of avoiding high future inflation and asset price bubbles, as 
well as its general appropriateness for maintaining financial stability,10 it is feared that keeping 
interest rates low and opening bail-out opportunities could induce serious moral hazards 
undermining the will to reform (Feldstein 2015). In recent years, however, it can be seen from 
Figures 1 to 4 that the situation seems somewhat improved, as external imbalances between the 
core and the periphery appear to reverse, unit labor costs fell in the GIIPS and, even though 
late, growth returned along with decreasing debt-to-GDP ratios. Whether these adjustments are 
sustained and stem from adequate policies and the stipulated structural changes (Varga et al. 
2013; ECB 2015b; European Commission 2016) or rather come from cyclical factors (Tressel 
and Wang 2013; Tressel et al. 2014) is debatable and should be differentiated by country.11  
Is the European integration project at risk? 
Among many other reasons, the recent crisis experience and the contentious response of the EU 
(dominated by 19 EA member states) may have been one factor that fueled the British 
skepticism against Brussels and Frankfurt and led to the ‘Brexit’-decision in 2016. In fact, the 
prolonged economic malaise in Europe, which is perceived to have lasting impact for the living 
standard of whole generations, fostered negative attitudes against the EU and the Euro not only 
in Britain. It seems that it even paved the way to a new wave of nationalism, giving rise to 
                                                          
8 See Joyce et al. (2012) for an introduction to unconventional monetary policy and ECB (2015a) and 
Driffill (2016) for a discussion of the ECB measures and their impacts. 
9 See the website of the European Commission (2018) for details and timeline of the reformed economic 
governance framework. 
10 See, e.g., Smets (2014), Borio and Zabai (2016), and Blot et al. (2017) who provide overviews of the 
vast literature.  
11 See Kang and Shambaugh (2016) who provide detailed discussions of the unwinding of external 
imbalances. 
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populist parties in almost every member state that seek to end or even reverse the economic 
integration process (Baldwin et al. 2015). As resolving the crisis may require even closer 
integration, it remains to be seen if the necessary fortitude of European identities among the 
‘winners’ from integration will outweigh the national tendencies of those who are supposedly 
not benefitting or worse.12 At least, the attractiveness of the Euro for candidate countries like 
Poland has suffered noticeably, as membership has been postponed indefinitely into the future. 
But, also within the current EA, diverse economic conditions and hence opinions over the 
proper reforms may foster imperfect crisis solutions and constitute once again new impediments 
to a smoothly operating future EMU.13 
Assessing and achieving convergence within EMU 
As summarized above, the question of convergence or divergence of macroeconomic 
parameters among a diverse set of 28 EU countries is crucial for a smoothly operating monetary 
union and the future integration process as a whole. While the catching-up of lower-income 
peripheral member states certainly implies transitory divergence of some variables, the euro 
crisis highlighted clearly that a high degree of real and nominal homogeneity among the 
participating EA countries is important for both maintaining financial stability and finding a 
‘one size fits all’ monetary policy for the core and the periphery. The purpose of this dissertation 
is therefore to empirically assess how the group-dynamic convergences and divergences in 
European macroeconomic developments affect the efficiency and stability of EMU. From a 
policy perspective, exploring the evolving homogeneities among individual countries and 
groups in the data is important for two main reasons. First, it provides the basis for pursuing 
adequate supra-national policies aimed at achieving convergence within and beyond the 
existing EA. And second, it can be used to evaluate any EU countries’ suitability for staying 
inside or joining the EA in the future, unless one expects convergence as a consequence of 
membership anyway, a perception discussed further below. While the latter issue is – at least 
implicitly – considered in all of the subsequent research articles, the first paper discusses the 
necessary reforms in greater detail. 
To this end, the dissertation is structured into three different albeit related approaches (Chapters 
2 to 4 introduced further below) that employ empirical techniques, such as cluster analysis, 
                                                          
12 See Fligstein et al. (2012) for a discussion of this issue. 
13 Jones et al. (2016) describe what can be seen as the “failing forward” of European integration. 
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principal components analysis, correlation analysis, and factor models, which are capable of 
identifying commonalties in large multivariate datasets. A fundamental issue thereby is of 
course the choice of meaningful macroeconomic indicators that can be used to assess the well-
functioning of a monetary union. The economic literature as well as the EU legislation provide 
many possible parameters that may be considered relevant in this context. 
Convergence of what parameters? 
From a theoretical point of view, the literature on optimum currency areas (OCA) provides 
manifold criteria concerning the potential costs and benefits of fixing the exchange rate or 
sharing a common currency. On the one hand, countries can benefit from reduced transaction 
costs and price transparency fostering competition, international trade, and investment activity. 
On the other hand, the macroeconomic costs arise from losing the monetary and exchange rate 
policy flexibility in the event of asymmetric shocks (Campos et al. 2017). The latter, in turn, is 
more or less disadvantageous depending on several alternative adjustment mechanisms. 
Whereas the traditional OCA contributions in this context suggest the flexibility of prices and 
wages (Friedman 1953), labor mobility (Mundell 1961), financial market integration (Ingram 
1962), a high degree of openness (McKinnon 1963), the diversification of the economy (Kenen 
1969), the similarity of inflation rates (Fleming 1971) and a fiscal transfer system (Kenen 1969) 
to be relevant pre-conditions for a beneficial common currency, Frankel and Rose (1997) 
stressed the endogeneity property of a monetary union (Mongelli (2005; 2008); Dellas and 
Tavlas (2009)). Through increasing intra-industry trade relations due to the economic and 
monetary integration itself, the participating countries’ cyclic correlations would increase so 
that the costs of sharing a common currency would decrease endogenously over time. This 
hypothesis, however, stands in contrast to the theory of diverging business cycles emanating 
from the potential inter-industry specialization of economies that may be likewise triggered by 
the integration process (Krugman 1993). 
Consequently, while the fulfillment of OCA criteria is ambiguous and subject to several 
endogeneities surrounding the interaction between integration, flexibility, and symmetry (De 
Grauwe and Mongelli 2005), the literature has focused on business cycle synchronization of 
(prospective) EA members as a univariate meta-criterion (Mongelli 2005). It should indicate 
whether countries are more or less hit by asymmetric shocks that require country-specific 
monetary policy responses. Hence, the simple logic behind this is that when business cycles are 
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commoving the cost of sharing a common currency are expected to be low.14 This aspect has 
been dealt with in the third and fourth chapters of the dissertation.  
In practice, the suitability of prospective Euro countries was thought to be ensured by the 
Maastricht convergence criteria. It was demanded of the candidates that, prior to entering the 
EA, the economy should achieve convergence of its long-run interest and inflation rates as well 
as stability of its exchange rate and fiscal stance (budget deficit of less than three percent of 
GDP and total government debt of less than 60 percent of GDP). The latter two fiscal criteria 
were also proclaimed in the stability and growth pact (SGP), which envisaged along with the 
no-bail-out legislation the monetary union-inherent moral hazards linked with the separation of 
fiscal and monetary policy (Frankel 2015) and the potential externalities of excessive debt 
accumulation (Beetsma and Uhlig 1999). However, the Maastricht criteria (as well as the 
SGP15) turned out to be insufficient regarding the well-functioning of EMU for several reasons. 
First, the criteria need to be fulfilled only once to enter the EA. Second, all criteria are nominal 
and therefore neglect the fundamental structural homogeneity among Euro countries. And third, 
they are not binding so that the final decision is political. Remarkably, this is despite the quite 
extensive economic literature that have evolved under the OCA notion.  
Today, the well-functioning is supposed to be safeguarded by additionally monitoring the 
broader macroeconomic imbalances discussed above. As part of the ‘Sixpack’ reform measures 
of 2011, the EU introduced the MIP as a surveillance tool aimed at detecting and preventing 
national competitiveness losses as well as internal and external imbalances that could also 
undermine the smooth functioning of EMU (European Commission 2012). Since the 
scoreboard indicators, which today comprise 14 real and nominal parameters, have been 
developed in the light of the economic developments that caused the euro crisis, they provide 
an adequate starting point for highlighting group-dynamic con- and divergences.   
Operationalizing relevant criteria and highlighting con- and divergences 
Thus, by operationalizing these MIP criteria, the first article of the dissertation (‘One Size Fits 
Some: A Reassessment of EMU’s Core-periphery framework’16, Chapter 2) aims at indicating 
                                                          
14 De Haan et al. (2008), Kappler and Sachs (2013), and Campos et al. (2017) provide summary studies. 
15 See, for instance, Heipertz and Verdun (2004), Feldstein (2005), and Eichengreen (2005), who provide 
analyses of the rationale, flaws, and history of the SGP. 
16 The paper has been published in the Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 31 (2), 2016, pp. 377-413 
together with Markus Stahl. 
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homogenous country groups in terms of external balances, competitiveness, indebtedness, and 
economic performance over the period 2004 to 2013. This is done in an unprejudiced manner 
using two cluster techniques and principal components analysis that provide data-based proof 
of the often-claimed core-periphery division in Europe. More specifically, the identified groups 
indeed consist of the GI(I)PS countries (plus Cyprus and Croatia), the CEECs, and the Central 
European core countries, respectively. When comparing the results with the existing EA, we 
find it striking that the current composition of the EA is inadequate based on the EU’s own 
surveillance tool. While, on the one hand, the GI(I)PS countries are found to constitute a fairly 
distinct group requiring specific policy treatment, on the other hand, some of the non-EA 
members such as Denmark, Sweden, and the UK belong to the core group of countries that 
could by itself form an efficient and stable monetary union. Repeating the exercise at different 
points in time reveals that the GIPS countries were grouped together already before the global 
recession of 2008/09 and further diverged thereafter. However, it should be noted that for some 
countries, like Italy and Hungary, the distance to the core cluster appears less dramatic as 
indicated by the second fuzzy clustering approach, which sets a relative degree of belongingness 
to all clusters for all countries. Moreover, despite forming a quite distinct cluster too, the 
accession of CEECs seems generally less problematic, because peculiarity also stems from low 
debt levels and rising export market shares, which cannot be judged negatively. This in turn 
points to the limitations of multivariate clustering that are addressed by applying the principal 
components analysis to the MIP scoreboard of indicators. As noted before, using many 
potentially correlated country features may impede economic interpretation regarding monetary 
integration, as the distinctiveness of any identified group can be due to over-weighted or 
contradictory criteria (Artis and Zhang 2001). Another way of coping with these problems is 
the univariate assessment of cluster structures undertaken in Chapter 3. 
The second article of this dissertation named ‘The core-periphery pattern of European business 
cycles: A fuzzy clustering approach’17 (Chapter 3) specifically deals with the identification of 
business cycle clusters and group-specific business cycles in Europe between 1996 and 2015. 
As highlighted by the first article, a latent core-periphery pattern appears to undermine the 
efficiency and stability of the EA in its current composition. The literature, however, often uses 
this division only in terms of the cyclical co-movements of national GDP or industrial 
production time series, either presuming the respective cluster members or grouping them 
                                                          
17 The paper has been published in the Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 55 (1), 2018, pp. 12-27 together 
with Markus Ahlborn. 
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according their synchronicities with a reference cycle. This cycle has almost always been set 
without empirical verification, too. By applying a time series cluster analysis, we tackle both 
problems simultaneously and provide for the first time a comprehensive picture of clusters and 
group-specific cycles in the EU without imposing any other assumptions than varying the 
number of clusters to find the optimal solution.  
Indeed, we find clear evidence of a core-periphery cyclical division along the lines of a Central 
European core group, a southern periphery, and an eastern periphery again, of which the latter 
can be further partitioned into the Baltics, the south-eastern transition countries, and Bulgaria 
and Romania. More specifically, the countries’ fuzzy membership coefficients for all clusters 
indicate that while some non-EA countries among the CEECs (Hungary and to a lesser degree 
the Czech Republic, and Poland) as well as Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK exhibit 
strong similarities with the core business cycle, the GIPS countries do not (anymore). By using 
time-varying synchronization measures with the core business cycle, we show that, whereas the 
southern periphery in fact diverged since the global recession of 2008/09, the eastern periphery 
converged. 
It is important to bear in mind that the multiple group-specific European cycles of Chapter 3 
have been imposed and do not exclude that there is also a particular ‘European business cycle’ 
like other potentially regional cycles around the world. The corresponding high degree of union-
wide synchronization would of course be the best-case scenario for a single ‘one size fits all’ 
monetary policy. But empirical findings on this issue are mixed and should be interpreted with 
caution as evidence of such a European business cycle (e.g., Artis et al. 2004) may in fact as 
well be a result of limited sample sizes indicating global rather than European co-movement 
(Kose et al. 2003). Whereas Lumsdaine and Prasad (2003) and Mansour (2003) find a European 
cycle coexisting with a global business cycle, more recent studies like Canova et al. (2007) and 
Camacho et al. (2008) negate the existence of a specific European cycle.  
Therefore, the third article (‘Global vs. group-specific business cycles: The importance of 
defining the groups’18, Chapter 4) examines the question of whether distinct group-specific 
business cycles, such as the European business cycle, have emerged that may have become 
more important for domestic fluctuations than a global business cycle in a large-scale dataset 
of 106 countries and three macroeconomic variables (real output, real consumption, and real 
                                                          
18 The paper has been submitted to the Journal of International Money and Finance together with Tino 
Berger. 
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investment) covering the period of 1960 to 2014. Such regional factors may have gained 
importance for a number of reasons, including the profound increase in intra-regional trade and 
financial flows over the past decades that is increasingly of the intra-industry type.19  
Within Europe, for example, a large and growing body of empirical literature finds that efforts 
of economic and monetary integration of the past decades indeed fostered trade (Micco et al. 
2003; Baldwin 2006; Baldwin et al. 2008; Bun and Klaassen 2007; Berger and Nitsch 2008; 
Glick and Rose 2016; Glick 2017) and financial ties (Lane 2006; Spiegel 2009; Kalemli-Ozcan 
et al. 2010) significantly. However, quantifications range between 3 percent of an EA-related 
(Bun and Klaassen 2007) and up to 70 percent of an EU-related trade plus (Glick 2017) and 
should be interpreted in the context of both high independent European trade growth over the 
long-run and even more dynamic trade increases with countries outside the EA (Mongelli 
2008). Empirical evidence generally suggests that economic and financial integration of 
countries rather increases business cycle synchronization (see, for instance, Imbs (2006), and 
Dées and Zorell (2012)). But, as many integration processes overlap and isolating particular 
impacts is a difficult task, it still seems unclear whether the observed increase in European 
business cycle co-movements is due to the establishment of a monetary union (Campos et al. 
2017) or emanated from a more general synchronization process (Canova et al. 2012; Enders et 
al. 2013). In order to disentangle the relative importance of the global from group-specific, 
country-specific, and idiosyncratic determinants of national macroeconomic fluctuations, a 
dynamic factor model is estimated using Bayesian techniques. But essentially different from 
the previous literature, to which we compare our results, the underlying country groups are 
identified by a cluster analysis of the business cycle data rather than assumed according to the 
countries’ geographic proximity or the time-invariant level of development.  
By doing so, we find that the degree of similarity among all the industrialized economies is 
indeed high, but two subgroups are still well distinguishable at lower aggregation levels of the 
hierarchical clustering that have not been considered previously. Specifically, we identify one 
‘Central European’ cluster comprising also Japan and one ‘Anglo-Saxon’ cluster containing 
besides Ireland, the UK, and some Northern European economies as well the USA, Canada, 
and Oceania. The fact that Ireland and the UK and later the Northern European countries as a 
‘Northern periphery’ evolved somewhat differently from their continental partner countries 
clearly proves that, besides extensive regional European trade and financial integration, inter-
                                                          
19 See Hirata et al. (2013) who also provide an overview of the literature.  
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regional linkages too played a significant role. This might be due to historically pronounced 
trade ties or linguistic reasons, as the broad Latin American cluster of South-, Middle-, and 
North American countries suggests. For Ireland and Finland, even higher similarity with 
countries outside than inside the EA may imply problems with the appropriateness of the ECB 
monetary policy that depend on the extent of dissimilarity between the Central European and 
the Anglo-Saxon cycles.  
Imposing these data-based group-specific factors into the dynamic factor model shows that they 
play an increasingly important and much greater role than both the global factor and the pre-
specified purely regional or development-based counterparts, particularly in Europe. For the 
EU-12 economies, for example, the group-specific factors explain, on average, 48 percent of 
national output variability compared with only 20 and 26 percent that would be captured by the 
cross-regional and the industrialized economy factors, respectively. Over the second sub-period 
starting in the mid-1980s, this share even rose to 63 percent, suggesting cyclical convergence 
within the two country groups to has increased substantially. On the other hand, the global 
business cycle is found to be less important and even becoming negligible over the more recent 
time period for most of the countries. While for the average EU-12 country, output variability 
is still 12% explained by the global factor, for all countries this figure is just above 4%, raising 
the question of whether the global factor common to multiple variables is diminishing.20 
Overall, these findings underline the increasing importance of group-specific trade and 
financial linkages which can be influenced decisively by the abolishment of trade barriers and 
supra-national policies within the European integration process. 
In sum, this dissertation attempts to complement the economic literature, where it falls short of 
providing conclusive empirical evidence of the group-dynamic macroeconomic developments 
in Europe. As such an assessment of the con- and divergences particularly between the core and 
the peripheral member states may be regarded as crucial for evaluating the prospects of EMU, 
the subsequent Chapters 2 to 4 provide the basis for the concluding Chapter 5 that formulates 
some policy implications for individual countries and groups within this framework.  
 
 
 
                                                          
20 See Berger and Pozzi (2018) and Karadimitropoulou and León-Ledesma (2013) for recent evidence 
in this direction. 
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Abstract
This study provides a new multivariate assessment of core–periphery structures within 
the European Union. By applying different cluster algorithms to the broad set of 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure indicators, we detect a relatively stability-oriented 
and homogeneous group of European Union core countries that would be suitable for 
having a common currency. Unlike previous results, our analysis shows that countries 
such as the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Sweden would also fit well within such 
a hypothetical euro area. However, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain plus 
Cyprus and Croatia on the southern periphery, as well as most of the countries of the 
eastern enlargement are found to form very distinct clusters in terms of competitiveness, 
indebtedness, and economic performance. Our findings thus reveal that a single 
monetary policy can be appropriate only for some countries, even when measured using 
the official Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure scoreboard specifically designed to 
monitor the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union.
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I. Introduction
The ongoing crisis of the euro area shows that even after 16 years of common currency, 
a one size fits all monetary policy cannot be conducted smoothly in a distinct core–
periphery framework. Even though many economists warned early-on against the rapid 
introduction of the euro within a large heterogeneous group of insufficiently prepared 
economies,1 the famous endogenous theory of Frankel and Rose (1998) raised hopes 
of ultimately overcoming any disparities. So far, this remains a vision, and the initially 
claimed stability orientation2—marked by similar and low inflation, a stable exchange 
rate, and sustainable debt levels—remains out of sight. Instead, the monetary union 
itself fostered macroeconomic imbalances both within and between Greece, Ireland, 
Italy, Portugal, Spain (GIIPS countries) in the south and the core countries in the north. 
Large economic disparities in terms of competitiveness, indebtedness, and economic 
performance have put the European Central Bank (ECB) in a desperate position: while, 
for instance, many countries in the latter group now need a stronger euro and higher 
interest rates, the opposite holds for the southern periphery. However, during the crisis, 
the ECB found itself forced to apply an expansive monetary policy aiming to support 
the GIIPS countries’ struggle for recovery, simultaneously fighting an alleged deflation 
risk. This recent monetary policy has often been criticized by the core countries for its 
negative effects on domestic savings, price bubbles, and the ECB's balance sheet, as well 
as for dangerous fiscal debt financing, which in turn will establish negative incentives for 
budgetary discipline and the necessary structural reforms. In addition to the one size fits 
some monetary policy described above, the European Union (EU) has also introduced 
the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) for highly indebted countries, as well as other 
1 Feldstein (1997), p. 41. The critique of German economists can be found in the Financial Times of February 9, 1998: "The Euro 
starts too early." Jonung and Drea (2010) provide an extensive overview of critical American economists.
2 The concept of a stability orientation was put forward by the German Federal Constitutional Court as a precondition for Germany's 
participation in the EMU in the Maastricht Judgement (BVerfGE 89, 155, October 12, 1993, Az: 2 BvR 2134, 2159/92).
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measures aimed at addressing high youth unemployment and low investment activity on 
the southern periphery. The reassessment of core–periphery structures is thus important 
not only for establishing a proper monetary policy but also for developing common 
economic policy strategies to overcome tenuous disparities.
The following analyses provide a clear data-based picture of core–periphery 
structures, depicting more precisely what is often thought of as a simple north–east–
south division. To do so, we follow a multidimensional approach rather than only 
looking at, for example, output synchronization, as is often done to distinguish between 
core and peripheral areas within the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Instead, 
we apply different cluster algorithms and Principal Components Analysis (PCA) to 
the Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP) indicator set, which was designed to 
capture the most relevant economic developments responsible for the smooth functioning 
of EMU (European Commission 2012). As these indicators were chosen against the 
background of the euro area crisis experience, we believe cluster analysis on this basis to 
be a new and reasonable approach to assess the core–periphery dynamics of the EMU. 
Moreover, the MIP scoreboard includes data for every EU member state and thus allows 
us to identify a relatively stability-oriented and homogeneous group of EU core countries 
that are theoretically suitable for a common currency. Our results provide an economic 
indication of how well the current EMU members and outsiders fit into the currency 
area. While our findings suggest that countries such as the United Kingdom (UK), 
Denmark, and Sweden could easily share a common currency with the core countries, 
others, such as the GIIPS countries, clearly require different treatment. With respect 
to the appropriate level of integration, this article provides new impetus to the recently 
heated debates about Greek Exit (GREXIT) from the euro area and British Exit (BREXIT) 
from the EU. Therefore, we analyze the magnitude and similarity of internal and external 
imbalances to contribute to academic and political solution strategies to the euro crisis.
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section II first introduces the 
existing literature on core–periphery dynamics in the EMU. Then, we explain why the 
MIP scoreboard provides a proper basis for assessing the underlying disparities. The 
methodology and data are introduced in Section III, followed by the presentation of the 
results of the cluster analyses and PCA in Section IV. Section V addresses the policy 
implications and Section VI concludes.
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II. Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure
This article contributes to the literature on core–periphery dynamics, especially 
those related to European monetary integration. Before the introduction of the euro in 
1999, it was questioned as to which countries would belong to a promising core group 
or periphery in light of the optimum currency area theory (Bayoumi and Eichengreen 
1993, 1994, 1997). In contrast, the theory of an endogenous currency area proposed by 
Frankel and Rose (1998) states that potential member countries did not have to fulfill 
certain optimal conditions ex ante but would rather form an optimal currency area ex 
post. Advocates of the endogeneity hypothesis saw a positive correlation between trade 
integration and output synchronization as monetary unification itself would increase 
intra-industry trade flows. Economic theory, however, suggests that economic integration 
could lead to more specialization and increased inter-industry trade, facilitating 
asymmetric supply shocks (Caporale et al. 2014). In this theoretical controversy, 
Europe's business cycle synchronization has usually been the focus of empirical 
investigation and is seen as a meta criterion for an optimal currency area (Mongelli 
2008, de Haan et al. 2007). If shocks and business cycles were found to converge in the 
EMU, this was interpreted as support for the endogenous view (Gachter and Riedl 2014). 
However, other studies discovered decreasing output synchronization and a diverging 
pattern of core and peripheral areas (Pentecote and Huchet-Bourdon 2012, Caporale et 
al. 2014, Lehwald 2013).
When the euro crisis emerged in 2010, other dimensions of the core–periphery 
division of EMU came back into academic focus. Macroeconomic imbalances in and 
between southern and northern EMU member states concerning competitiveness, 
indebtedness, and economic performance became apparent and required some root-
cause analysis to enhance future governance (for a discussion of the interdependence 
of different crises, see Shambaugh 2012). The formerly weak-currency countries of 
the southern periphery experienced extensive capital inflows due to the removal of 
risk premia in the run-up to EMU. While this facilitated public and private sector 
consumption, it rarely led to investment-driven productivity gains. Prices and wages 
in these countries did rise, but they subsequently lost their competitiveness and built 
up persistent current account deficits that could no longer be reduced by nominal 
depreciation (Fischer and Hobza 2014). The GIIPS countries eventually experienced 
slow growth, high unemployment, and deflationary pressures after the global financial 
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crisis (Eichengreen 2010), but many often-labeled core countries, such as Germany, 
Austria, and the Netherlands, were able to recover much faster. The hope of an 
endogenous monetary union which could, in the meantime, find some support in business 
cycle patterns (European Commission 2008) gave way to an alarming divergence in 
output gaps between core and peripheral countries (European Commission 2014a).
Current disparities between EMU member states are closely related to certain 
internal imbalances. The consumptive use of capital inflows in the non-tradeable sector, 
which triggered housing price bubbles in Ireland and Spain, as well as extensive private 
and public debt accumulation, contributed to worsening current account deficits and 
international investment positions of the GIIPS countries (Fischer and Hobza 2014). The 
resulting debt crisis documented again that monetary integration itself created incentives 
and opportunities for the south to finance demand-side growth by borrowing from the 
north (Hall 2012). Although such group dynamic effects of public debt in a monetary 
union (Beetsma and Uhlig 1999), as well as the respective incentives to free ride, were 
clear from the beginning (Horstmann and Schneider 1994, Ohr 2004), all institutional 
arrangements to ensure stability proved to be insufficient to resolve—or even instead 
exacerbate—the public debt crisis (Lane 2012).
In 2011, the EU introduced MIP as a new governance tool to monitor and correct 
future imbalances. The MIP scoreboard of 11 macroeconomic indicators, together with 
critical thresholds, offers a substantial and eligible database to investigate the EU's core–
periphery structures as it transforms the multidimensional developments described above 
into measureable criteria essential for the smooth functioning of a monetary union. 
Moreover, these criteria not only include a mix of flows and stocks, as well as nominal 
and real figures, but also capture backward moving averages, which make them more 
robust to short-term fluctuations. The indicators are as follows:3
• Three-year backward-moving average of the current account balance in percentage of GDP, 
with a threshold of +6% and − 4%;
• Net international investment position in percentage of GDP, with a threshold of −35%;
• Five-year percentage change in export market shares measured in values, with a threshold 
of −6%;
• Three-year percentage change in nominal unit labor cost, with thresholds of +9% for euro-
area countries and +12% for non-euro area countries, respectively;
3 Scoreboard summary taken from European Commission (2012) and Fischer and Hobza (2014). See both for further details on 
indicators and the design of the MIP. The 2013 MIP scoreboard can be found in Table 1.
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• Three-year percentage change in real effective exchange rates based on HICP/CPI deflators, 
relative to 35 other industrial countries, with thresholds of ±5% for euro-area countries and 
±11% for non-euro area countries, respectively;
• Private-sector debt in percentage of GDP, with a threshold of 160%;
• Private-sector credit flow in percentage of GDP, with a threshold of 15%;
• Year-on-year changes in the house price index relative to a Eurostat consumption deflator, 
with a threshold of 6%;
• General government sector debt in percentage of GDP, with a threshold of 60%;
• Three-year backward moving average of the unemployment rate, with a threshold of 10%; 
and
• Annual growth rate of total financial sector liabilities, with a threshold of 16.5%.
The MIP was designed as an early warning system that would detect risks for 
the monetary union as a whole. If the commission encounters violations of certain 
thresholds, it provides in-depth reviews and action plans for corrective policy measures 
in the affected countries. In the case of non-compliance, sanctions can be imposed 
on EMU member states as a last resort. This procedure focuses on country-specific 
imbalances measured by absolute indicator values. It is, of course, a legitimate approach 
concerning internal and external stability matters but does not check for the homogeneity 
of country values as another precondition of a smoothly working monetary union. 
From this viewpoint, a large current account surplus, as seen in Germany, can only be 
judged as an excessive imbalance if most of the other member states do not have similar 
surpluses (Gros and Giovannini 2014). Therefore, for the purpose of this study, we 
follow a relative perspective and consider between-country disparities of MIP indicators 
as risks for the stability and efficiency of EMU. Hence, the lower the disparities in real 
exchange rates, current account balances, unit labor costs, and unemployment, the more 
possible it will be to define a one size fits all monetary policy. In addition, the monetary 
transmission channels will work better if private-sector credit flows are fairly similar.4 
Finally, the more alike private and public sector indebtedness levels are, the lower the 
risks of country-specific confidence losses, sudden liquidity stops, spillover effects, and 
the need for financial support or monetary action to bail out other EMU member states.
To identify relatively homogeneous groups of core and peripheral countries based 
on the MIP indicators, we now employ different cluster methods, which are yet to be 
4 Gruber and Ohr (2001) discuss the relevance of different financing structures and monetary transmission channels for the 
functioning of a monetary union.
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used in this context. For instance, KÖnig and Ohr (2013) and Rozmahel et al. (2013) 
recently used hierarchical cluster analyses to uncover some multidimensional politico-
economic forms of heterogeneity in the EU. Quah (2014) groups EU countries based on 
their business cycle synchronicities with the euro area using a fuzzy clustering technique. 
Considering specifically the core–periphery division of EMU with the help of some 
optimal currency area criteria, Artis and Zhang’s (2001) cluster analysis revealed that 
at the time, only five of the 13 EU countries under investigation formed a suitable core 
group (France, Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, and Germany). The same authors (Artis 
and Zhang 2002) later applied another cluster technique to the Maastricht convergence 
criteria, adding Italy, Spain, and Portugal to the core cluster. Based on this work, 
Boreiko (2003) and Kozluk (2005) studied the readiness of Eastern European candidate 
countries for EMU membership using cluster analyses. Artis and Zhang (2001) formerly 
concluded: A finding of inhomogeneity in the ranks of the putative EMU must suggest 
that a one-size-fits-all monetary policy will be appropriate to certain member countries 
and could threaten the union’s sustainability. A key issue here, which this analysis 
cannot comment upon, is how far this problem will prove transitory (as the endogeneity 
literature suggests) or, on the other hand, persistent. 
Taking this as a case for reassessment, we now, after 16 years of monetary union and 
five years of the euro-area crisis, shed some light on the current scenario.
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III. Data and Methodology
The extensive data bank of the European Commission and Eurostat for the main 
11 MIP scoreboard indicators and some auxiliary indicators serve as the basis of the 
following analysis in Section IV and Section V. At the time of writing, complete annual 
scoreboard data are available for all 28 EU member states from 2004 to 2013. This 
period will be sufficient to investigate the effects of the global financial crisis, as well as 
of the euro-area crisis, on the EMU's core–periphery setting over time.
Previous empirical research employed the scoreboard indicators to predict crises 
and find optimal country group-specific thresholds to improve the performance of the 
early warning system. Therefore, Logit/Probit models and neural network analysis have 
been used, whereas the latter explicitly accounts for the interaction of variables (Knedlik 
2015). In contrast to this literature, we make use of the scoreboard data to assess the 
degree of heterogeneity across EU member states.
To identify homogeneous groups within a population of objects (here countries) 
based on several features (here indicators), two different cluster methods are applied. 
First, a hierarchical agglomerative procedure is used to identify a reasonable grouping. 
Then, we perform a partitioning method to check the sensitivity of the first result. The 
algorithms used—Ward's method and Fuzzy C-Means (FCM)—are briefly described 
in the following pages, focusing on why these procedures were chosen (Kaufman und 
Rousseeuw 2005). The data were first standardized to eliminate differences in scale and 
treat all indicators as having the same weight.
The algorithms are based on the measurement of the squared Euclidean distance 
between two objects i and h:
 d = (xi −  xh)2 =  
p
 
k =1 ∑  (xik 
−  xhk)2                                                (1)
For all features (k=1, …, p), the pairwise differences in the observed values xik (for 
i=1, ..., n) are squared and afterwards summed. This yields an n × n distance matrix with 
each country initially forming a separate cluster.
In the first step of the Ward approach, the two countries with the smallest squared 
Euclidean distance between them are paired. Then, the distance of the resulting first 
cluster to all the other objects must be recalculated. The shortest distance is essentially 
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calculated so that the smallest increase in heterogeneity would arise in the new cluster 
after merging different objects or clusters. This heterogeneity within formed clusters can 
be determined based on the sum of squared errors (V) of a cluster j:
 V = j 
n
 
i
j
=1  ∑
p
 
k =1
∑  (xikj − −  xkj )2                                                 (2)
with xikj = observation of indicator k of country i (for every country in cluster j) 
xkj = mean of indicator k in cluster j
If there are n individual clusters at the starting point, the sum of squared errors is 
zero in each case as no variation within the cluster exists. In each step of the process, 
the distance between object or cluster A and a new cluster (B + C) is updated using the 
following equation:
D (A;B + C ) = 1 nA + nB+ nC 
  * {( nA + nB )* d(A;B) + ( nA + nC )* d(A;C)− nA* d(B;C)}  (3)
with nA, nB, nC = number of objects in clusters A, B, and C
where D is here twice the increase in the sum of squared errors in Equation (2). If 
every time the specific objects and clusters with the smallest distance between them are 
combined, only one cluster exists in the end, which includes all objects (Backhaus et al. 
2008).
Ward’s method is often regarded as the best hierarchical clustering algorithm as the 
true grouping in the data can reliably be identified (Bergs 1981). It also tends to form 
equal group sizes, so its use in the context of core–periphery structures seems sensible. 
However, the grouping results in Section IV can be replicated in a very similar manner 
using the average linkage method (see Appendix 1).
A general problem in cluster analysis is determining the optimal number of clusters 
corresponding to the data as far as possible. As there is usually no substantive information 
on the accuracy of the number of clusters that should be chosen, several statistical test 
criteria can be used to provide a more objective definition. For instance, when applying 
Ward's method, we can use the Calinski–Harabasz pseudo F-test (Backhaus et al. 2008). 
However, in our case, with only 19 or 28 objects, it is also possible to check the optimal 
number of clusters through plausible assumptions. While Ward's method also makes it 
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possible to choose a proper classification visually using the dendrogram, with the FCM 
algorithm the number of clusters must be determined ex ante, so that the results vary 
depending on the initial setting. Concerning the data corresponding to best choice, there 
is a wide literature on cluster validity (Whang and Zhang 2007).The FCM algorithm 
used here goes back to Bezdek (1981). In contrast to the clear assignment of an object to 
a cluster with hard clustering, in fuzzy logic, a degree of membership uij is determined 
for each object i in all clusters j. Hence, a fuzzy partition matrix Ucxn is formed with 
∑
C
j=1 uij=1. The aim of this procedure is to recalculate the position of the predetermined 
number of cluster centers and the membership degrees iteratively, so that at the end of 
the process, no further improvement in the cluster assignment is possible.
To this end, the objective function
 
   (4)
                                            J  (   ,U V  ) =  
n
 
i =1  ∑
c
 
j =1
∑ uij m −  vjxi 2                                                 
must be minimized.5 Here, u denotes the degree of membership of a country i in cluster 
j and || xi — vj ||2 is the squared Euclidean distance between country i and cluster center v. 
We can use Equation (5) and Equation (6)
     , 1 ≤  j ≤ c                                             (5)                                         V = j n mi =1∑   (    )
xi 
uij
n m
i =1∑   (    )uij
                                                 
 
                                            , 1 ≤  j ≤ c , 1 ≤  i ≤ n                         (6)                            
 =  
m1/(     1)− 1−
 
c
 
ɡ=1
∑uij 
−  vjxi 2
−  vɡxi 2(           )                                            
  
to minimize the objective function. (Wang and Zhang 2007)
5 The m parameter has an influence on how clearly the cluster allocation to the objects appears. In the following analysis, it is set to the 
value of 2.
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IV. Results 
 
A.  Results of the Ward algorithm
First, an agglomerative cluster analysis is undertaken of all current EU member states 
for the year 2013 using the Ward algorithm. Figure 1 shows the results of this analysis 
in the form of a dendrogram. It can immediately be seen that three different groups 
of countries6 are identified at a distance of 37—apart from Luxembourg, which can 
be assessed in many ways as an outlier.7 The cluster at the bottom of the dendrogram 
comprises Belgium, France, Austria, Italy, Finland, Hungary, Slovenia, Slovakia, the 
UK, Denmark, Germany, Malta, the Netherlands, and Sweden. As this group primarily 
consists of powerful economies in Central and Northern Europe, it will be referred to as 
the core group hereafter.8
6 Also, the Calinski–Harabasz pseudo F-test indicates a reasonable number of four clusters (with Luxembourg).
7 In particular, due to the net international investment position, private-sector credit flow, and private-sector debt (see Table 1).
8 Although even core group countries exceed MIP thresholds (see Table 3 below), this cluster best fits the requirements of a stable 
monetary union.
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Figure 1. Dendrogram of the cluster analysis for the EU in 2013
CroatiaGreeceCyprusSpainPortugalIrelandLuxembourgRomaniaLithuaniaPolandCzech RepublicEstoniaLatviaBulgariaSwedenNetherlandsMaltaGermanyDenmarkUnited KingdomSlovakiaSloveniaHungaryFinlandItalyAustriaFranceBelgium
0                                    50                                  100                                 150
Distance
(Note) Cluster analysis using the Ward algorithm.
(Source) MIP scoreboard (Eurostat and European Commission), own calculations and presentation.
Countries of the EU enlargement (Bulgaria, Latvia, Estonia, Czech Republic, Poland, 
Lithuania, and Romania) are clustered with some distance into an eastern periphery 
group. Finally, at a further considerable distance, a group often referred to as the 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain (GIPS countries) together with Cyprus and Croatia, 
is located at the top of the dendrogram. This cluster may be labeled as the southern 
periphery because it includes primarily those countries most affected by the euro-area 
crisis and partly dependent on EU assistance. Today, the euro area with its 19 members 
comprises the majority of countries in the core group and those of the southern periphery 
(except Croatia). It thus comprises two groups of countries with extremely different 
economic conditions. This result confirms the intuitively used core–periphery structure 
during the euro area crisis and proves cluster analysis based on the MIP indicators is a 
proper empirical tool for examining the functioning of EMU.
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Figure 2. Evolution of clusters in the euro area from 2004 to 2013
Figure 2a: Euro area 2004
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 Figure 2c: Euro area 2010
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Figure 2d: Euro area 2013
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 (Note) Cluster analysis using the Ward algorithm. Luxembourg and the house price index variable were dropped 
due to data gaps in the scoreboard for 2004.
(Source) MIP scoreboard (Eurostat and European Commission), own calculations and presentation.
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Considering now only the current euro-area member states, remarkable insights can also 
be obtained into the evolution of heterogeneity over the past 10 years. The dendrogram 
for 2004 (Figure 2a) shows that the core group differs by a wide margin from both 
the eastern and southern member states. Moreover, in 2007 (Figure 2b), before the 
financial crisis, the countries now in crisis can clearly be identified as a separate group, 
although the most marked distance is still that occurring between the core countries and 
the group of Eastern European countries. By 2010 (Figure 2c), three countries (Malta, 
Slovenia, and Estonia) from the eastern peripheral group are seen to be approaching the 
core cluster, even though they still remain identifiable therein as a homogeneous group. 
Meanwhile, the countries of the southern peripheral group move away from the core 
group (Figure 2c). Finally, in 2013, they are clustered far from both the eastern periphery 
and the core (Figure 2d).
B. Results of the Fuzzy C-means algorithm
According to the results of the Ward method, the countries of the Eastern European 
periphery and the GIPS countries (plus Cyprus and Croatia) clearly differ from the 
core group in 2013. Looking at the bottom of the dendrogram in Figure 1, further 
differentiations within the core group itself seem possible. At this point, the advantages 
of the FCM clustering algorithm can be used to calculate degrees of membership instead 
of the explicit assignment of a country to a cluster, as previously undertaken. The 
countries are therefore each assigned by a certain percentage to all clusters. Assuming 
again three clusters in the EU-28, the cluster analysis allows a more accurate assessment 
of countries' extent of belonging to the respective groups (Table 2, left).
Measured by the highest degrees of membership, the FCM algorithm largely 
confirms the cluster structure of Figure 1. However, Slovakia is instead assigned to 
cluster 2 of the Eastern European countries and Italy to cluster 3 of the GIIPS countries, 
which seem both geographically and economically plausible. Italy especially is often 
considered one of the crisis countries in terms of declining competitiveness, rising debt 
levels, and increasing unemployment rates. Furthermore, it is striking that Hungary, 
the only country from the 2004 EU enlargement in cluster 1, has a relatively low level 
of membership in this cluster and is relatively similar to all clusters. Moreover, Italy is 
added to cluster 3 but has a slightly lower coefficient for cluster 1. Croatia, the youngest 
member of the EU, has the greatest similarity to the crisis countries due to its recent poor 
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economic situation.
Table 2. Cluster membership of the EU in 2013
Country Degree of membership if c=3 Degree of membership if c=4Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3 Cluster 4
Belgium 0.592 0.273 0.135 0.379 0.384 0.161 0.075
Bulgaria 0.274 0.607 0.119 0.191 0.184 0.557 0.068
Czech Republic 0.316 0.544 0.140 0.230 0.321 0.364 0.085
Denmark 0.568 0.265 0.167 0.481 0.268 0.158 0.093
Germany 0.622 0.249 0.129 0.527 0.257 0.145 0.071
Estonia 0.290 0.569 0.141 0.203 0.180 0.533 0.084
Ireland 0.241 0.217 0.542 0.190 0.261 0.161 0.389
Greece 0.214 0.199 0.587 0.142 0.191 0.130 0.537
Spain 0.175 0.178 0.647 0.114 0.156 0.115 0.615
France 0.484 0.299 0.217 0.143 0.721 0.081 0.054
Italy 0.349 0.226 0.425 0.218 0.438 0.132 0.212
Croatia 0.263 0.260 0.477 0.195 0.296 0.181 0.328
Cyprus 0.234 0.198 0.568 0.162 0.201 0.132 0.504
Latvia 0.241 0.617 0.141 0.153 0.177 0.591 0.079
Lithuania 0.240 0.600 0.160 0.159 0.186 0.562 0.093
Luxembourg 0.404 0.371 0.225 0.321 0.253 0.275 0.151
Hungary 0.391 0.309 0.300 0.242 0.445 0.168 0.144
Malta 0.664 0.258 0.079 0.597 0.223 0.139 0.041
Netherlands 0.525 0.272 0.203 0.445 0.267 0.169 0.119
Austria 0.691 0.215 0.094 0.517 0.297 0.131 0.055
Poland 0.273 0.518 0.209 0.191 0.319 0.365 0.125
Portugal 0.103 0.103 0.794 0.075 0.124 0.073 0.728
Romania 0.267 0.543 0.190 0.192 0.246 0.442 0.121
Slovenia 0.430 0.233 0.337 0.287 0.399 0.136 0.177
Slovakia 0.270 0.572 0.159 0.197 0.255 0.448 0.100
Finland 0.502 0.277 0.221 0.341 0.354 0.174 0.131
Sweden 0.444 0.383 0.173 0.366 0.245 0.280 0.109
United Kingdom 0.431 0.340 0.228 0.299 0.327 0.231 0.144
(Note) Cluster analysis using FCM algorithm; c: number of clusters; highest degrees of membership are high-
lighted in gray.
(Source) MIP scoreboard (Eurostat and European Commission), own calculations and presentation.
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Further differentiation is possible if the EU-28 is separated into four clusters (Table 
2, right). Now cluster 2, except Italy, only comprises countries from the former core 
group (Belgium, France, Italy, Hungary, Slovenia, Finland, and the UK). Hence, when 
allowing for some heterogeneity within the clusters, the previous analysis confirms the 
assumption of three major distinct groups within the EU-28: the Northern European 
economies, the countries of EU enlargement, and the southern peripheral crisis countries.
C. Indicators defining the core and the periphery
The current disparities in Europe are thus confirmed very clearly by cluster analysis. 
Now, taking a closer look at the single indicators should help to clarify the characteristics 
and causes of the north–east–south division described above in greater detail. Table 3 
shows the average indicator values for the three country groups,9 as well as the total euro 
area. As can be seen, until 2013, significant disparities exist between the core countries 
and the eastern and southern European peripheries in terms of competitiveness, debt 
levels, and unemployment.
While the core group as a whole has a positive current account balance averaged 
over three years, the other two clusters run negative balance sheets. Hence, a stronger 
euro would suit the core countries, whereas the two peripheral groups could clearly 
benefit from a weaker currency. This problem can also be seen on the capital account 
side, where large negative net foreign investment positions are found in the latter group. 
It is striking that both the southern periphery and Eastern European countries are far 
below the MIP threshold of -35%. This can at least partly be seen as an indication of 
an economic catching-up process. However, the high external liabilities, particularly of 
the crisis countries, still represent a high risk because they consist a large extent of debt 
rather than FDI inflows (Fischer and Hobza 2014, European Commission 2015a).
9 For the exact cluster classification below, the results of FCM clustering (Table 2, left) are used.
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Table 3. Features of the identified clusters in 2013
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6% 14% 133% 60% 16.5% 10%
Core group 2.1 10.4 -0.6 -14.5 6.2 -2.5 0.1 140.4 83.1 -4.3 7.4
Eastern 
periphery -1.3 -55.9 0.7 10.6 7.2 3.4 2.9 85.4 35.5 3.0 13.1
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periphery -2.0 -118.3 -2.0 -14.4 -4.5 -5.4 -6.2 224.3 124.1 -10.1 17.7
Euro area 0.5 -26.6 -0.6 -8.3 3.8 -1.6 0.4 162.3 80.7 -3.6 11.2
(Note) EA: euro area.
(Source) MIP scoreboard (Eurostat and European Commission), own calculations and presentation.
On the other hand, the real devaluation and reduction in unit labor costs in the 
southern periphery over the three years prior to 2014 seem to be less of a concern. This 
was a necessary adaptation that led to better competitiveness of the Southern European 
crisis countries. However, it again reflects the dilemma of current monetary policy that 
low inflation or even deflation is necessary to regain competitiveness in the southern 
periphery while for the rest of the euro area, an inflation rate of more than 2% would 
have to be sought for this purpose. Therefore, a single monetary policy with an average 
inflation target of 2% is not equally suitable for all countries. On the part of the core 
countries and the eastern periphery, unit labor costs increased in this period.
Apart from some Eastern European countries, export market shares decreased from 
2009 to 2013 in all countries. Therefore, even the average of all euro-area countries 
is below the threshold of -6% in this period. However, this development can also be 
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explained by changes in the global economic situation and the larger export market 
shares of emerging economies in Asia. The observation of individual country values for 
this indicator is not very productive.
Rather, a comparison with the average loss of the euro area makes sense (Gros 
and Giovannini 2014). According to the 2013 scoreboard, 17 EU countries exceed the 
threshold. However, compared with the average loss of export market shares especially, 
the situations of Greece and Cyprus, as well as that of Finland, with losses considerably 
more than twice the average, are worrying (European Commission 2015b).
Although most core countries also exceed the private and public sector debt 
thresholds, with limits of 133% and 60% respectively, they are still well below the 
extreme values of the countries of the southern periphery (with averages of 224% and 
124% respectively). In contrast, the Eastern European countries are at much lower and 
harmless levels (an average of 85% and 35%). However, while the negative private 
credit flows in the southern periphery can be seen—at least for Spain, Portugal, and 
Ireland—as a sign of private debt reduction, this has not yet happened in Greece 
(European Commission 2015b). The core and east of the euro area differ in their private 
sector credit flows at a low level and only slightly from each other. Overall, despite 
ECB’s expansionary monetary policy, a weak demand for credit has so far undermined 
the intended effect on growth.
The change in the inflation-adjusted house price indicator, which is intended to 
show the risk of price bubbles in the real estate market, develops differently between 
the country groups. Besides the significant negative corrections of previous years in 
the Southern European countries and apart from slight increases in Germany and the 
Netherlands, the house price indicator also declines moderately in the core countries. The 
positive average in the Eastern European countries is caused by increases in Estonia and 
Latvia, which are more than four times as high as the euro-area average.
Unemployment rates still differ greatly between country groups. While they are 
moderate at 7.4% in the core group, they are at 17.7% in the southern periphery. In the 
crisis countries, and in Croatia particularly, youth unemployment has reached record 
levels of close to or above 40%. Ongoing fiscal austerity and the expectation of only 
weak economic growth worsen the prospects of a quick improvement in the situation 
(European Commission 2015b). Against this background, it is difficult to say whether 
and when the ECB will be able to reverse its low interest rate policy in favor of the 
Southern European crisis economies. This underlines the need for effective economic 
policy measures in these countries.
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D. Robustness
The previous division into groups was initially based on an equally weighted use 
of all 11 scoreboard indicators. Therefore, the similarity in current account balances 
was assumed to be just as important as the similarity in lending or unemployment 
rates. However, aside from this assumption, it is important to know which disparities 
are potentially more dangerous than others and which variables might have common 
explanatory power. Ultimately, a differently weighted or modified number of indicators 
might explain the core–periphery structure. Thus, in accordance with Kozluk (2005), 
we carry out PCA, which reduces the number of 11 original variables to three 
underlying main components that explain 70% of the total variation. High values for 
the first principal component generally correspond to declining unit labor costs and 
housing prices, a negative net international investment position, negative private sector 
credit flows, and a decrease in total financial sector liabilities, as well as high general 
government debt and a high unemployment rate. In contrast, the second principal 
component correlates strongly and positively with the indicators for current account and 
private debt levels and negatively with export market share. A graphical representation of 
the first two principal components in Figure 3 shows that such an analysis identifies the 
same three clusters as in the previous cluster analysis. (The third principal component, 
which is highly correlated with the real exchange rate, was not shown for reasons of 
clarity of illustration but would not change the cluster structure.) Also visible is the 
unclear attribution of Italy and Hungary, which are found lying between two groups, as 
well as the classification of Luxembourg as an outlier.
42
jeiOne Size Fits Some: A Reassessment of EMU’s Core–periphery Framework
399
Figure 3. Country groups according to the first two principal components
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(Source) MIP scoreboard (Eurostat and European Commission), own calculations and presentation.
V. Policy Suggestions 
A. Suitability for EMU membership 
Our results indicate that recent economic developments in Denmark, the UK, and 
Sweden are similar to those in the core countries of the euro area. In particular, all cluster 
specifications suggest that Denmark and Sweden exhibit strong similarities with Malta, 
the Netherlands, and Germany. Based on these results, the functioning of the EMU 
would not be impaired by the accession of these countries. Hence, our findings do not 
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provide economic justification for the countries’ opting out decisions and thus clearly 
differ from the earlier results of Artis and Zhang (2002). But citizens of Denmark, the 
UK, and Sweden have always been skeptical towards the euro primarily for social and 
political rather than for economic reasons (see Müller-Peters et al. 1998 for a cross-
national study on these factors). Issues like national pride and identity seem to play a 
crucial role for the attitude of a country towards the euro (Müller Peters 1998). In this 
regard, the first referendum decisions of Denmark and Sweden to retain their national 
currencies could be attributed to a more general feeling of meddling by the European 
Union. In the case of Denmark, the EMU referendum debate was influenced by other 
political issues like immigration policy (see Bering 2000 for the case of Denmark and 
Sunnus 2004 for Sweden). Since then, the Eurobarometer frequently confirmed that the 
degree of skepticism against the EMU is highest among the Danish, Swedish and British 
population compared to other member states of the European Union. 
Resistance may have increased further due to the fact that the majority of voting 
power in the European Union is now held by EMU member states. This links European 
decision-making with the common needs of the euro area and its current crisis, which 
may also explain, why the UK will rather hold referendum about the withdrawal from 
the European Union as a whole. In general, skepticism towards the European Union and 
its decision-making process is a phenomenon common across all EU member states. 
However, in the northern European countries such as the UK, Denmark, and Sweden 
this skepticism focusses primarily on currency matters (Condruz-Băcescu 2014). 
The experience from the euro area crisis even has worsened this situation since the 
deteriorating economic conditions in other member countries have additional negative 
impacts on domestic public attitudes towards the European Union (Ioannou, Jamet, and 
Kleibl 2015). 
Those countries at the southern euro area periphery are already part of the monetary 
union. This group is significantly different from the rest with regard to many indicators, 
thereby causing existential problems for the functioning and stability of the euro area 
as a whole such that even its continued existence in the current constellation is at risk. 
If these countries remain inside the monetary union this is likely to further reduce the 
attractiveness of the euro, in particular for stronger economies like the UK, Denmark and 
Sweden. 
The Eastern European group also differs from the core group, so it would be difficult 
to define a single monetary policy. However, these disparities should not be considered 
solely negative. Indeed, although there is a relatively high unemployment rate, at the 
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same time, those economies gain export market share and run only moderate current 
account deficits. Moreover, they historically have very low private and public debt, 
which makes them much less prone to solvency crises than southern EMU member 
states. 
B. Achieving greater homogeneity in the EMU 
The analysis has shown that the current euro area comprises countries with very 
diverse features. Hence, with respect to a “one size fits all” monetary policy considering 
union-wide average values, basically two possible conclusions emerge. The most 
obvious one would be the break-up of the existing euro area offering the chance for 
countries suffering from the crisis to devaluate their new domestic currencies. From 
the perspective of a smoothly working monetary union, this is what our results clearly 
suggest. However, the actual decision of countries to participate in the euro area (or 
even in the EU) should also depend on country specific considerations such as network 
externalities and switching costs (Dowd and Greenaway 1993), which are beyond the 
scope of this article. 
If, on the other hand, these countries were to retain the euro for political reasons, 
our results show that it would be essential for core and peripheral groups to converge 
regarding the MIP indicators. To achieve such convergence within the current euro area, 
internal devaluation and structural reforms in this case are thought of as important means 
of adjustment (Shambaugh 2012). Figure 4 shows recent developments in selected 
MIP indicators for the previously defined clusters. At first glance, reforms appear to 
be successful and disparities between country groups tend to resolve. For example, 
nominal unit labor costs in the southern periphery have declined since 2008 (Figure 4a). 
Due to falling wages and prices, these countries have experienced a real depreciation 
(see also Table 3), which has helped them regain their price competitiveness to some 
extent. However, the corresponding current account improvements (Figure 4b) are 
based predominantly on crisis-related import reductions, making them unsustainable in 
the case of economic recovery (European Commission 2015a, 5). If one also takes into 
account that the GIIPS countries appreciated between 1995 and 2007 by 30% relative to 
the remaining EMU member states (Sinn 2013, 3), a further substantial readjustment of 
relative prices seems unavoidable to rebalance current accounts in the long run (Kang 
and Shambaugh 2013, 18). 
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To permanently reestablish the competitiveness of the southern periphery, further 
wage adjustments thus need to be supplemented by productivity gains (Frankel 2015, 
431). Moreover, the scoreboard analysis shows that external imbalances are only 
one part of the problem. Besides low exports, also restrained private and government 
spending and lack of investment currently contributes to persistent weak aggregate 
demand in the GIIPS countries. Growth and employment are suffering from the ongoing 
private deleveraging and consolidation of public finances in addition to the deflationary 
environment. Overcoming this weakness in demand by promoting public and particularly 
private investments, as conducted by the so-called Juncker plan, appears to be one step 
in the right direction. If it succeeded in raising productivity, unit labor costs could further 
be reduced, aggregate demand increased, and the still high unemployment will continue 
to fall (Figure 4d). Moreover, such investment driven growth is essential to consolidate 
public budgets and could contribute to their ongoing improvement, which is apparent in 
Figure 4c. 
As a baseline for the needs of the south described above, far-reaching structural 
reforms influencing competitiveness, growth, and employment through a variety of 
short- and long term channels would be indispensable. Even in a highly integrated euro 
area, positive spillovers can indeed emanate from coordinated structural reforms for core 
and peripheral country groups (European Commission 2014b).
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Figure 4. Average values of selected indicators 
Figure 4a. Nominal unit labor costs, year-on-year change
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(Note) MIP threshold: 9%.
(Source) Eurostat, own calculations.
47
jei Vol.31 No.2, June 2016, 377~413                                         Marcus Wortmann and Markus Stahl 
http://dx.doi.org/10.11130/jei.2016.31.2.377
404
Figure 4b. Current account balance
(% of  GDP)
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(Source) OECD, own calculations.
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Figure 4c. Fiscal deficits
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(Source) Eurostat, own calculations.
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Figure 4d. Unemployment rate
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VI. Conclusion 
In this paper we have used the MIP scoreboard indicators to investigate cluster 
structures within the EU and EMU. By applying two different cluster methods we found 
large heterogeneities between the southern and eastern periphery, and the core countries 
in central Europe. Hence, our findings are in sharp contrast to the endogeneity hypothesis 
of an optimal currency area and also question the commitment of an ever closer union – 
at least for all countries. Our results not only confirm earlier research on the economic 
disparities between the GIIPS and the core countries during the euro crisis but may also 
serve as an indication of how well an EU member state fits into the monetary union. 
Regarding the economic suitability, on the one hand, the clustering would suggest the 
UK to join the euro area rather than holding a referendum about the so-called BREXIT 
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from the EU. On the other hand, the results support the view that most of the deficit 
countries, especially Greece, should rather exit the euro area, as their membership 
seriously impairs the efficiency and stability of the monetary union. For the euro area in 
its current formation, our analysis highlights the need for fundamental structural reforms 
in order to reestablish the well-functioning of EMU. Therefore, our approach helps 
detecting significant disparities across countries and finding adequate policy responses 
for each group of countries exhibiting different economic features. Future research may 
carry out cluster analysis on the upcoming MIP scoreboard data to evaluate, weather the 
EMU succeeds to increase the degree of homogeneity across member states.
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Appendix 1: Dendrogram of the cluster analysis for the EU in 2013
Luxembourg
Croatia
Greece
Cyprus
Spain
Portugal
Ireland
Sweden
Slovakia
Romania 
Lithuania
Poland
Czech Republic
Estonia
Latvia
Bulgaria
Netherlands
Malta
Germany
Denmark
Slovenia
Hungary
Finland
United Kingdom
Italy
Austria
France
Belgium
Distance0                               2                               4                              6                               8   
(Note) Cluster analysis using the average linkage algorithm.
(Source) MIP Scoreboard (Eurostat and European Commission), own calculations and presentation.
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Appendix 2: Correlation matrix and cumulative variances
MIP-Indicators Component 1
Component 
2
Component 
3 Component
Cumulative 
variance explained
Current Account 
Balance -0.496 0.564 -0.308 1 0.429
Net Internat. 
Investment Position -0.756 0.475 -0.158 2 0.604
Real Effective 
Exchange Rate -0.467 0.102 0.730 3 0.702
Export Market 
Shares -0.483 -0.677 0.144 4 0.776
Nominal Unit 
Labor Costs -0.860 -0.095 -0.116 5 0.831
Deflated House 
Price Index -0.707 -0.067 0.440 6 0.877
Private Sector 
Credit Flow -0.771 0.087 -0.093 7 0.912
Private Sector Debt -0.029 0.715 0.306 8 0.942
General Government 
Sector Debt 0.787 0.328 0.004 9 0.971
Total Financial 
Sector Liabilities -0.699 -0.413 -0.284 10 0.990
Unemployment Rate 0.709 -0.322 0.120 11 1.000
(Note) Cumulative variance explained for the principal components of the scoreboard indicators in 2013.
(Source) MIP scoreboard (Eurostat and European Commission), own calculations and presentation.
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591. Introduction 
Since the adoption of a single European currency in the early 1990s, the synchronization of business cycles between Eu-
ropean economies has become a major ﬁeld of both theoretical and empirical research. The main objective of this literature
is to investigate the extent to which a common ‘European business cycle’ is established that applies as a basic condition for
a smoothly working monetary union ( Artis et al., 2004 ). In fact, the global ﬁnancial crisis and the subsequent euro crisis
have rather provided evidence of large economic discrepancies primarily between groups of countries within and beyond
the euro area (EA). Therefore, cyclical (dis)similarities should be considered from a group perspective, for instance between
the ‘vulnerable’ economies in Southern Europe ( European Commission, 2014 ) or the Central and Eastern European countries
(CEECs; Fidrmuc and Korhonen, 2006; Stanisic, 2013; Di Giorgio, 2016 ) and the Central European countries. 
A conventional scheme for the analysis of business cycle patterns among groups of (prospective) EA members is the core–
periphery division ( Camacho et al., 2006 ). As opposed to the Southern, the Eastern and sometimes the Northern European
‘periphery,’ a homogeneous ‘core’ group is typically identiﬁed among the founding EU Member States, with Germany at its
center (see, for instance, Arestis and Phelps, 2016 ). Assuming that the supposed core countries share similar business cycles,
say the ‘European core business cycle,’ policy makers may thus be interested in how closely countries are associated with
this cycle compared with other group-speciﬁc European cycles. However, the identiﬁcation of core and peripheral European
business cycles and the potential group composition remain inconsistent in the literature. In this paper we propose a more∗ Corresponding author. 
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60comprehensive way to explore the core–periphery pattern empirically by conducting a fuzzy cluster analysis of business
cycle time series, which allows us to provide detailed information on countries’ accordance with group-speciﬁc European
business cycles. 
Some previous studies, like those by Artis and Zhang (2002), König and Ohr (2013) and Wortmann and Stahl (2016) ,
identify a suitable core group for the EA through cluster analyses based on different sets of static macroeconomic criteria,
partly related to the optimum currency area (OCA) theory. Among these cyclical similarities are only considered implicitly.
Despite taking into account a variety of criteria, the multivariate approaches face diﬃculties in selecting and weighting the
potential variables that may be regarded as relevant preconditions for a smoothly working monetary union. Consequently
the obtained country groups may be driven by inadequate, potentially correlated country features dominating the cluster-
ing process. Artis and Zhang (2001) also point to the fact that multivariate cluster analysis groups countries regardless of
whether their similarity is due to negative or positive features in terms of a well-functioning monetary union. If the driving
factors of the group assignment remain unclear, the suitability of any cluster for monetary uniﬁcation will be unclear too.
However, the few multivariate analyses are the exceptions, as the vast majority of studies dealing with the core–periphery
division concentrate on business cycle synchronization. 1 For these reasons the present paper focuses on business cycles and
connects all the results to the extensive literature summarized below. 
When time series data on business cycles are used, basically two different ways of assessing the core–periphery pat-
tern can be distinguished. Darvas and Szapary (2008), Hughes Hallet and Richter (2008), Crespo-Cuaresma and Fernández-
Amador (2013), Lehwald (2013), Caporale et al. (2015), Arestis and Phelps (2016) and Belke et al. (2016) analyze business
cycles using various methods within or across putative groups like the ‘GIPS countries,’ the ‘peripheral countries’ or the ‘core
countries’ that are set in advance. Hence, the assignment of each country to its group is subject to general assumptions at
best taken from the literature. As pointed out by Belke et al. (2016) , ‘there exists no exact deﬁnition as to which countries
belong to the core or to the periphery.’ For instance, there is no consensus on the classiﬁcation of Italy. Some studies locate
it on the southern periphery (e.g. Hughes Hallet and Richter, 2008; Caporale et al., 2015 ), but recent evidence suggests that
it shows a great deal of business cycle synchronization with the core ( Belke et al., 2016; Campos and Macchiarelli, 2016 ).
Following the idea that countries will be more or less connected to any existing group-speciﬁc European business cycle, the
fuzzy clustering approach adopted here allows us to quantify each country’s degree of belongingness to all the identiﬁed
clusters. Moreover, while the literature focuses on the distinction between the core and the Southern European periphery,
the classiﬁcation of the CEECs, among them prospective EA member countries, is of special interest. 
The second approach to classifying countries as belonging to the ‘core’ or the ‘periphery’ is to analyze their relation to
a reference cycle. The ﬁrst authors to do so are Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) , who base their analysis on correlations
of the national supply and demand shocks with those of Germany as an ‘anchor’ or ‘center’ country. Pentecôte and Huchet-
Bourdon (2012) repeat this exercise but additionally control for correlations vis-à-vis the EA (11) reference area. They ﬁnd
that ‘France, rather than Germany has served as an anchor point for convergence of the other EU countries.’ The study by
Aguiar-Conraria et al. (2013) uses wavelet tools to analyze the synchronization between an aggregate EA (10) economic sen-
timent cycle and the national cycles. Their ﬁndings also reveal that the composition of a core group is not quite intuitive,
because the core itself can even be divided into a ‘German pole’ and a ‘French pole’ also comprising Italy and Spain, re-
spectively. Based on industrial production data, Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2011) reach similar conclusions, conﬁrming the
leading role of the French business cycle. 
Obviously, an important assumption of such analyses is the choice of a suitable proxy for the supposed but unobservable
European business cycle. So far Germany’s business cycle, a weighted EA average and the EA’s aggregate cycle are used fre-
quently as such reference measures for business cycle synchronization analyses. 2 Using a representative core country, like
Germany, as a reference is generally justiﬁed by the ‘leading economy’ argument but will be problematic if this country’s
business cycle, temporarily and for idiosyncratic reasons, deviates from all the others. As will be discussed in Section 3 be-
low, our results indicate that Germany’s cycle indeed does not qualify as a suitable anchor. Even the EA’s aggregate cycle
is an inappropriate proxy for the European core business cycle, as it may be distorted by large economies, like Spain or
Italy, that possibly belong to peripheral clusters. Darvas and Szapary (2008) cope with this problem to a certain extent by
estimating a common factor of the supposed core group as a reference. However, membership of this core is again arbitrary
and not based on cyclical similarities. Finally, Camacho et al. (2006) and Mink et al. (2012) state that neither the existence
of one single European cycle nor its compliance with any chosen reference can readily be assumed in advance, casting doubt
on many results of previous business cycle analyses. 
Similarly, the previous clustering analyses of Artis and Zhang (20 02), Boreiko (20 03), Kozluk (2005), Crowley (2008) and
Quah (2014) assess the suitability of (prospective) EA member countries by grouping them according to their synchronicities1 In the OCA theory, business cycle synchronization is regarded as a ‘catch all’ or ‘meta criterion’ in analyzing the costs and beneﬁts of monetary unions. 
Participating countries with synchronized business cycles will need less autonomy in monetary and exchange rate policies, and thus the costs of losing 
direct control over such policy areas are reduced ( Mongelli, 2005 ). However, whether having synchronized business cycles should be considered as a 
prerequisite for a smoothly working monetary union is still subject to debate. According to the endogeneity hypothesis of Frankel and Rose (1997) , a 
high degree of business cycle synchronization may rather be achieved ex post due to increased trade linkages. De Haan et al. (2008) and Kappler and 
Sachs (2013) provide surveys of business cycle synchronization in Europe. 
2 See, for instance, Artis and Zhang (1997), Furceri and Karras (2008), Afonso and Sequeira (2010), Savva et al. (2010), Aguiar-Conraria and Soares (2011), 
Gächter et al. (2012), Mink et al. (2012) and Kolasa (2013) , among others. 
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61with the same references. The clustering algorithms used are based on static feature data, such as the pairwise correlation
coeﬃcients between the national and the reference cycle. However, as pointed out by Mink et al. (2012) , the simple cor-
relation coeﬃcient of two time series does not provide a proper basis for assessing the coherence of the business cycles.
Despite perfectly coinciding phases of up- and downswings, the cycles may only be correlated imperfectly due to their het-
eroscedasticity. Conversely, in the case of perfect correlation, the amplitude of the cycles may still differ substantially. To
deal with these shortcomings, we apply a time series cluster analysis that is based on cyclical distances. Instead of imposing
any reference cycle beforehand, the algorithm generates group-speciﬁc representative cycles during the clustering process. 
Hence, we let the data decide the number, location and shape of any such reference cycle, be it that of a European core
or any other peripheral cluster. This enables us to investigate further whether there is convergence or divergence between
the peripheral cycles and the European core cycle, especially since the global ﬁnancial crisis and the subsequent euro crisis.
While the previous cluster analyses do not include the recent time period, we speciﬁcally focus on the impact of these crises
on the cluster structure. Some evidence by Gächter et al. (2012) and Degiannakis et al. (2014) indeed shows that the coun-
tries that were most affected by the crises, mainly on the southern EA periphery, experienced a decline in synchronization
with the EA aggregate cycle thereafter. Ferroni and Klaus (2015) also ﬁnd that, since the outbreak of the crisis, the Spanish
cycle ﬂuctuations have evolved asymmetrically to the other EA (core) countries of their study (Germany, France and Italy).
We contribute to this rather limited literature by studying the changes that the crises caused for the core–periphery pattern
of 27 European countries, including the CEECs. Therefore, we divide our sample into a ‘pre-crisis period’ from 1996 to 2007
and a ‘post-crisis period’ from 2008 to 2015. 
In a nutshell, this paper’s purpose is to clarify empirically both the number of existing European business cycles and the
countries belonging to them. In particular, the following questions will be answered. (1) Is there a European core business
cycle? (2) How many peripheral cycles have been established and how do they relate to the core cycle? (3) To what extent
can each country’s business cycle be associated with these different business cycle clusters? 
We address these questions simultaneously by employing a fuzzy clustering approach to output gaps extracted from
national real GDP time series. The fuzzy c-means (FCM) algorithm directly separates the most similar business cycles into
several clusters, assigning to each country a degree of membership of the group-speciﬁc European business cycles at the
center of the clusters. To our best knowledge, this immediate way of assessing groups in the data has not yet been applied to
output gap series and provides some advantages for both future research and policy advice. In particular, our contributions
to the literature are the following. First, we offer a precise classiﬁcation of countries within the complex core–periphery
pattern of European business cycles, clarifying the position of controversial cases like Italy, the CEECs and Germany as
an anchor country. This classiﬁcation can provide valuable guidance for future studies on business cycle synchronization,
in which core and peripheral country groups have to be set beforehand. Second, we speciﬁcally analyze how this core–
periphery pattern has changed over time, especially since the global ﬁnancial crisis. Third, we provide a European core
business cycle that can be used as a more suitable anchor cycle in future studies. Finally, fourth, the relative belongingness
of each country to this representative core cycle provides information on the costs of sharing a common currency with the
core countries in terms of business cycle synchronization. 
With regard to the three questions posed above, our main results can be summarized as follows. (1) We ﬁnd evidence
supporting the existence of a persistent core cluster among the Central European economies. Remarkably, Germany exhibits
a lower degree of belongingness to the European core cycle, which clearly questions its common use as a reference country.
(2) There are some peripheral business cycle clusters corresponding to regional proximity in Europe: the CEECs split up
into clusters on the eastern periphery, most evidently in the Baltic and the South Eastern region. These clusters have appar-
ently converged towards the core since the global ﬁnancial crisis of 20 08/20 09, contrary to the members of the southern
periphery, the other distinct business cycle cluster to be found in the data. This latter cluster has rather diverged from the
core since the crisis. (3) Among other ﬁndings the ‘core membership coeﬃcients’ show that especially the ‘EA outs’ and
‘EU outs,’ Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, as well as some CEECs, especially Hungary and to a lesser degree the
Czech Republic and Poland, could adopt the euro at lower costs than countries on the eastern and southern peripheries, as
they apparently possess greater business cycle similarities to the core group. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data set and the clustering methodology
that we employ. Section 3 presents the results of the main cluster analyses, including the sample splits, and studies the
relationship between the European core business cycle and the peripheral cycles. Moreover, the robustness of our ﬁndings
is checked by altering the clustering design and the distance measurement as well as by dropping the crisis years 20 08/20 09
and including other OECD control countries. Finally, Section 4 concludes. 
2. Methodology 
2.1. Data and ﬁltering 
The following cluster analyses are based on output gaps extracted from time series of (seasonally adjusted) quarterly
real GDP for 25 EU Member States (the EU-28 minus Cyprus, Malta and Luxembourg) plus Norway and Switzerland ranging
from 1996 Q1 to 2015 Q4. We consider the latter two countries as they are highly integrated with the EU and because we
try to give a comprehensive picture of European business cycles regardless of EU or EA membership. However, the cluster
solutions obtained are not sensitive to their inclusion. The time series for most of the countries are collected from the
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62OECD main economic indicators (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal,
Finland, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Norway, Switzerland, Ireland, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Croatia,
Poland and Slovakia, plus – for robustness purposes – the USA, Japan and Korea). The remaining statistics, for Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania and Slovenia, are obtained from the Oxford Economics database. The reason for not considering previous business
cycle data is the lack of reasonable data for the CEECs, of which the cyclical accordance with the core countries may be
regarded as a key criterion for future accession to the monetary union. 
To avoid dropping any further data points at the edges of the sample period, we extract the stationary cyclical com-
ponents from the time series using the band-pass ﬁlter developed by Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003 , [CF]). The ﬁlter is
set to extract periodic ﬂuctuations lasting between 6 and 32 quarters. For robustness purposes, however, we also apply the
high-pass ﬁlter by Hodrick and Prescott (1997 , [HP]), which does not change the general cluster solutions apart from some
deviations in membership degrees (see Section 3.4 ). All the output gaps are then expressed as a percentage of the cyclical
component of the trend component. We choose the CF band-pass and the HP high-pass ﬁlter as these are two of the most
commonly used ﬁlters in the literature with which to compare our results. The CF ﬁlter is used for the main analysis, as it is
speciﬁcally suitable for GDP series supposing a random walk with drift. It dominates the other commonly used Baxter–King
band-pass ﬁlter in real-time applications and does not require the omission of data points at the beginning or end of the
time series ( Christiano and Fitzgerald, 2003 ). 
2.2. Fuzzy c-means clustering 
The FCM algorithm that we employ is a widely used unsupervised clustering technique generalized by Bezdek (1981) . 3 Its
purpose is to partition the data into a given number of c clusters, each characterized by a cluster ‘centroid’ or ‘prototype’ at
the center. An iterative procedure varies the location of these centroids to ﬁnd the solution, which minimizes the weighted
sum of the squared Euclidean distances 4 between the objects (here countries) and the centroids. During that process each
object is repeatedly given a set of weights corresponding to the similarity that it exhibits to the varying centroids. The
more closely an object resembles the centroid of a speciﬁc cluster, the greater is the weight that it receives for that cluster.
By using these weights, also called membership coeﬃcients, the coordinates of the centroids are recalculated as similarity-
weighted averages (‘c-means’) of all the objects until an optimal solution is found. As the membership coeﬃcients sum up
to one, the fuzzy partition matrix u indicates how close an object is to the centroid of one cluster relative to the others. 
In particular, the following objective function should be minimized: 
J m (U, V ) = 
n ∑ 
i =1 
c ∑ 
j=1 
u m i j 
∥∥x i − v j ∥∥2 (1)
where u is the fuzzy membership matrix indicating the weights of time series x i in each cluster j and ‖ x i − v j ‖ 2 denotes
the squared Euclidean distance between the time series x i and each cluster’s centroid time series v j , while m stands for the
fuzziﬁer. 5 Minimizing J under the constraints 0 < 
∑ n 
i =1 u i j < n , 
∑ c 
j=1 u i j = 1 and 
∑ c 
j=1 
∑ n 
i =1 u i j = n yields: 
v j = 
∑ n 
i =1 ( u i j ) 
m 
x i ∑ n 
i =1 ( u i j ) 
m , 1 ≤ j ≤ c (2)
u i j = 
⎡ 
⎣ c ∑ 
g=1 
( ∥∥x i − v j ∥∥2 
‖ x i − v g ‖ 2 
) 1 / ( m −1 ) ⎤ ⎦ 
−1 
, 1 ≤ j ≤ c, 1 ≤ i ≤ n (3)
The algorithm generally proceeds in the following way: 
1 Randomly initialize u ji . 
2 Calculate c cluster centroids v j with Eq. (2) . 
3 Update u according to Eq. (3) . 
4 Calculate objective function J . 5 Return to step 2 until the improvement in J is less than the selected threshold. 
3 The following description of FCM is based on Wang and Zhang (2007) . Liao (2005) provides a short history of this method in his survey of time series 
clustering. For further details see Kaufman and Rousseeuw (2005) . 
4 The FCM algorithm was developed using the Euclidean distance norm (l1 norm), which we use for our main analyses. For robustness purposes, in 
Section 3.4 we also perform the clustering with the ‘Manhattan’ distance norm (l2 norm). Having time series data of equal length and scale, we rely on 
these two commonly used standard distance measures as they are parameter-free and competitive with other, more complex approaches that have been 
developed for time series clustering ( Wang et al., 2012 ). 
5 The fuzziﬁer controls the degree of fuzziness during the clustering process. According to Nikhil and Bezdek (1995) , m is usually set between 1.5 and 
2.5 depending on the degree of ‘fuzziness’ or ‘overlap’ in the data. Depending on the length of the time series we investigate and hence depending on the 
degree of fuzzy overlap in our different analyses, we adjust m to values within the usual bounds to achieve the highest silhouette (explained below) at a 
reasonable level of fuzziness. 
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63In the context of business cycle analysis, the resulting centroid time series v j correspond to the existing group-speciﬁc
European business cycles, whereas the respective membership coeﬃcient matrix u provides detailed information on the
extent to which a country can be assigned to each of the identiﬁed centroid cycles. Since a higher membership coeﬃcient
signiﬁes greater proximity to the respective cluster’s centroid, this allows a ranking of countries according to their degree
of belongingness. 
A wide array of different clustering algorithms is available. However, we are convinced that the FCM algorithm best suits
our research purposes, as its properties – clustering that is fuzzy and partitional – offer several advantages over other algo-
rithms for our application. First, as mentioned above, fuzzy clustering – as opposed to ‘crisp’ or ‘hard’ clustering algorithms
(e.g. those applied by Camacho et al., 2006 , 2008 ) – allows for different degrees of membership of all the clusters and does
not assign countries irrevocably and exclusively to just one group. On the one hand, such fuzziness enables us to rank the
countries according to their cyclical similarities to the European core business cycle, providing information on the costs of
joining the monetary union with the core countries. On the other hand, a fuzzy algorithm is better suited to dealing with
outliers. In a crisp partition, outliers tend to form separate clusters containing only that single object, while, in a fuzzy par-
tition, they tend to lie between the clusters exhibiting equal membership coeﬃcients. Consequently, the fuzzy partition is
less dominated by such single-object clusters, so outliers can be detected without distorting the remaining group structure
( Bezdek et al., 1982 ). 
Choosing a partitional algorithm as opposed to one that is ‘hierarchical’ 6 (e.g. that employed by Camacho et al., 2006 )
offers a further advantage for our purposes. While the FCM algorithm does not provide information on the cluster hierarchy,
it identiﬁes cluster centroids as similarity-weighted averages of all the countries based on their membership coeﬃcients. 7 
Using these representative cycles, we investigate their relationship over time, which clearly sets our analysis apart from
previous cluster analyses on business cycle data that only focus on the classiﬁcation of countries. 
However, the results of such a partitional cluster analysis will depend on the supposed number of clusters, which we do
not know beforehand. The problem of ﬁnding an optimal c without any prior information is known as cluster validity and
requires some measurement to compare the quality of the achieved cluster solutions with changing numbers of clusters. 8 
According to Nikhil and Bezdek (1995) , the number of clusters to choose is generally between two and the square root of n.
Note that increasing the number of clusters and hence creating more centroids will most likely alter individual membership
coeﬃcients, as these are relative values. With just 27 countries in our sample, the illustration of all the cluster solutions
thus allows us to trace the changes in the cluster assignment. Following Artis and Zhang (2002) , we consider the average
silhouette value s ( i ) for the comparison of these cluster solutions, which is deﬁned as: 
s ( i ) = b ( i ) − a ( i ) 
max [ a ( i ) , b ( i ) ] 
(4) 
a i : average distance from the i th point to the other points in the same cluster as i 
b i :minimum average distance from the i th point to points in different clusters 
The silhouette measures how well a cluster solution matches the actual data. Its values range from −1 to + 1, with higher
values indicating a superior solution, that is, the objects are well matched within their own cluster and poorly matched by
the others. Hence, a higher sample average value for s ( i ) indicates a cluster solution fulﬁlling the objectives of a cluster
analysis – homogeneity within and heterogeneity between clusters – to a higher degree. 
3. Results 
3.1. Business cycle clusters in Europe, 1996–2015 
The results of our main cluster analysis are presented in Table 1 , which summarizes the membership coeﬃcients of dif-
ferent numbers of clusters c for all 27 countries. A membership coeﬃcient close to 1 indicates that the country is close to
the center of its cluster, while low values indicate a large distance between the country and the respective cluster centroids.
The classiﬁcation of countries according to their highest membership coeﬃcient (bold ﬁgures) shows a clear core–periphery
pattern of European business cycles. Every speciﬁcation yields a cluster, which is centered by those countries typically re-
ferred to as the European core countries. 
This core cluster consists of the following twelve countries ranked by their average membership coeﬃcients over all
the cluster solutions: Austria (0.97), France (0.9–0.99), Denmark (0.92–0.96), Italy (0.88–0.98), the Netherlands (0.86–0.97),
the UK (0.8–0.96), Hungary (0.77–0.94), Sweden (0.78–0.9), Switzerland (0.72–0.93), Germany (0.76–0.84), Belgium (0.61–
0.97) and Finland (0.60–0.76). Quite surprisingly, Germany’s membership coeﬃcients are even slightly lower than those of6 Most hierarchical clustering algorithms merge objects and clusters in an agglomerative order, that is, initially all the objects form single clusters and 
are subsequently merged until there is one cluster comprising all the objects. These mergers are informed by distance measures (objects and/or clusters 
with the smallest distance are merged) and the grouping process can be depicted in a dendrogram. 
7 This ‘weighting by similarity’ constitutes a major advantage over ‘crisp’ partitional algorithms, such as k -means, as well. The centroids of k -means 
clustering are simply the averages of all the members of the clusters, while the centroids calculated with FCM are more inﬂuenced by countries close to 
the center of a particular cluster, as indicated by the membership coeﬃcients. 
8 For a survey on this issue, see Wang and Zhang (2007) . 
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Table 1 
FCM results (whole period 1996 Q1–2015 Q4). 
3-Cluster Solution 4-Cluster Solution 5-Cluster Solution 
m = 1.5 CF 
Filtered Data 
Cluster 1 
Core 
Cluster 2 
Baltics 
Cluster 3 
Eastern P. 
Cluster 1 
Core 
Cluster 2 
Baltics 
Cluster 3 
Eastern P. 
Cluster 4 
Southern P. 
Cluster 1 
Core 
Cluster 2 
Baltics 
Cluster 3 
Eastern P. 
Cluster 4 
Southern P. 
Cluster 5 
Bul. & Rom. 
Austria 0.97 0.00 0.03 0.97 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.97 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.00 
Belgium 0.97 0.00 0.03 0.61 0.00 0.02 0.37 0.61 0.00 0.02 0.36 0.00 
Bulgaria 0.12 0.00 0.88 0.05 0.00 0.89 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.10 0.06 0.79 
Croatia 0.35 0.01 0.64 0.30 0.01 0.43 0.26 0.05 0.00 0.89 0.04 0.02 
Czech Republic 0.45 0.00 0.55 0.41 0.00 0.28 0.31 0.41 0.00 0.13 0.32 0.13 
Denmark 0.96 0.00 0.04 0.92 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.92 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 
Estonia 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Finland 0.75 0.03 0.22 0.76 0.02 0.09 0.13 0.60 0.01 0.25 0.11 0.03 
France 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.90 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.92 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 
Germany 0.76 0.00 0.24 0.84 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.76 0.00 0.14 0.09 0.02 
Greece 0.41 0.02 0.57 0.20 0.01 0.27 0.52 0.18 0.01 0.21 0.43 0.17 
Hungary 0.94 0.00 0.06 0.79 0.00 0.02 0.19 0.77 0.00 0.04 0.18 0.01 
Ireland 0.52 0.05 0.43 0.31 0.03 0.21 0.45 0.26 0.03 0.17 0.40 0.14 
Italy 0.98 0.00 0.02 0.89 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.88 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.00 
Latvia 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Lithuania 0.04 0.91 0.05 0.05 0.86 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.77 0.11 0.03 0.04 
Netherlands 0.97 0.00 0.03 0.86 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.01 0.12 0.00 
Norway 0.82 0.00 0.18 0.37 0.00 0.07 0.55 0.38 0.00 0.10 0.50 0.03 
Poland 0.89 0.00 0.11 0.27 0.00 0.03 0.70 0.26 0.00 0.04 0.69 0.01 
Portugal 0.79 0.00 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.02 0.86 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.86 0.01 
Romania 0.17 0.02 0.82 0.08 0.01 0.81 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.96 
Slovakia 0.16 0.01 0.83 0.14 0.01 0.74 0.11 0.02 0.00 0.94 0.02 0.02 
Slovenia 0.23 0.01 0.76 0.31 0.01 0.53 0.16 0.21 0.00 0.59 0.11 0.07 
Spain 0.74 0.00 0.26 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.96 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.96 0.00 
Sweden 0.90 0.00 0.09 0.82 0.00 0.03 0.15 0.78 0.00 0.06 0.15 0.01 
Switzerland 0.93 0.00 0.07 0.72 0.00 0.03 0.24 0.74 0.00 0.03 0.21 0.01 
United 
Kingdom 
0.96 0.00 0.03 0.81 0.00 0.02 0.18 0.80 0.00 0.04 0.16 0.00 
Sample average silhouette Sample average silhouette Sample average silhouette 
0.3974 0.3301 0.3212 
Notes : The table summarizes the cluster results of our FCM approach of CF-ﬁltered quarterly real GDP (1996 Q1–2015 Q4; m = 1.5; c from 3 to 5). The 
values express relative membership of each cluster ( u ij ). The highest cluster membership is signiﬁed by bold letters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
64Hungary, Sweden and the UK, all countries that are not part of the EA. This conﬁrms previous evidence questioning the
‘leading role’ of the German business cycle (e.g. Aguiar-Conraria and Soares, 2011; Pentecôte and Huchet-Bourdon, 2012;
Aguiar-Conraria et al., 2013 ) and is a strong indication against using Germany’s cycle as a proxy for the European core
business cycle (as for example in the analyses by Artis and Zhang, 20 02 ; Boreiko, 20 03 ; Campos and Macchiarelli, 2016 ).
Belgium, another country that might be expected to be near the center of the core, is not a clear member of this cluster
either. The membership coeﬃcients show that it lies between the core (0.61) and the southern periphery (0.37) at c = 5. At
ﬁrst sight the clear core membership of Italy and Hungary might seem surprising, given that they are sometimes assigned to
peripheral clusters (especially Italy) or not included in an analysis of the European core–periphery pattern at all (especially
Hungary). As described above, there is some controversy over the classiﬁcation of Italy in the literature. We ﬁnd evidence
that Italy should not be included in a peripheral country group, as performed for example by Hughes-Hallet and Richter
(2008), Caporale et al., (2015) and Belke et al. (2016) . We also conﬁrm the consensual ﬁnding of the literature on the
synchronization of the CEECs that Hungary is the country that is the most synchronized with the EA (see Fidrmuc and
Korhonen, 2006; Savva et al., 2010; Kolasa, 2013; Di Giorgio, 2016 ). The synchronization with the core is so far advanced
that it should be assigned to a core group rather than a group of CEECs, as in the study by Arestis and Phelps (2016) . 
The second business cycle cluster to be found in all the speciﬁcations consists of the Baltic states of Estonia (0.97–
0.98), Latvia (0.99) and Lithuania (0.77–0.91). 9 The high membership coeﬃcients indicate that these countries form a very
distinct cluster in which the centroid apparently lies the furthest away from all the others. The third cluster, which we label
the eastern periphery, comprises Croatia (0.43–0.89), Slovakia (0.74–0.94) and Slovenia (0.53–0.76) in each cluster solution.
When the number of clusters is increased to four, the southern periphery – previously part of the core – is made up of
Portugal (0.86) and Spain (0.96), joined by countries with lower membership coeﬃcients, such as Poland (0.70), Norway
(0.55), Greece (0.52) and Ireland (0.45). This composition might be due to the recent crisis experience of the so-called GIPS
countries, which will be controlled for below. Remarkably, the membership coeﬃcients of the latter two countries as well
as that of the Czech Republic do not signiﬁcantly exceed 0.5. They can thus be considered as outliers that are not clearly9 In the two-cluster solution, which is not depicted here, the country sample is always divided into a cluster containing the Baltics and another cluster 
comprising all the other countries. 
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65assigned to one of the business cycle clusters. Finally, Bulgaria and Romania, which have so far been part of the eastern
periphery, form a distinct cluster at c = 5. 
The documented results reveal that the core–periphery pattern among European business cycles is complex. Any study
that explicitly divides the sample into a core group on the one hand and a peripheral group on the other oversimpliﬁes the
group structure of European business cycles that is revealed by the fuzzy clustering. First, the membership matrix shows
that – apart from Hungary and to a lesser degree Poland and the Czech Republic – most CEECs have a rather low degree
of business cycle synchronization with the European core. This conﬁrms the results of Kolasa (2013), Stanisic (2013) and
Di Giorgio (2016) , who ﬁnd a low synchronization between CEECs and the EA. Second, however, they do not constitute a
homogeneous group of synchronized countries. Our results reveal a great deal of heterogeneity among the CEECs, as they
split up into three different business cycle clusters at c = 5 . Hence, any study of European business cycle synchronization that
includes the CEECs should take this heterogeneity into account. Third, our result of a separate southern periphery cluster
around Spain and Portugal contradicts the ﬁndings of previous studies investigating the pre-euro crisis period, in which
a high degree of synchronization between the European core and these countries is detected (see, e.g., Camacho et al.,
20 06 , 20 08; Pentecôte and Huchet-Bourdon, 2012; Aguiar-Conraria et al., 2013; Lehwald, 2013 ). The ﬁnding is in line with
more recent studies of the post-crisis period ( Gächter et al., 2012 ; Ferroni and Klaus, 2015 ; Degiannakis et al., 2014; Belke
et al., 2016 ) that assign the two countries to the southern periphery. We will discuss this issue further in the context of
the crisis impacts below. Furthermore, the inclusion of Ireland and Greece in this group (as undertaken by various studies
analyzing the core vs. the GIPS, e.g. Lehwald, 2013; Caporale et al., 2015; Arestis and Phelps, 2016; Belke et al., 2016 ) might
be problematic, as our results indicate that these two countries constitute outliers and may, if included in any business cycle
group, drive the results due to their very idiosyncratic development. 
According to the OCA literature, an ideal monetary union would consist of countries with synchronized business cycles.
Hence, since all the members of the clusters that we identify exhibit a high degree of business cycle similarity, these clusters
would qualify as separate OCAs, at least in terms of business cycle synchronization. In reality, of course, more is involved
in determining the costs of sharing a currency. However, as the countries of the core are the economically and politically
powerful leaders of the European integration process (and most of them have already adopted the euro), the European
core business cycle obviously represents the only feasible anchor for current and prospective members of the monetary
union. The membership coeﬃcients thus allow for inference on the costs of being a member of the EA. In this regard the
adoption of the euro in the ‘opt out’ countries of Denmark, Sweden and the UK, as well the ‘EU out’ Switzerland, would
be unproblematic, a result that supports the ﬁnding of the multivariate cluster analysis by Wortmann and Stahl (2016) . The
same holds for Hungary, since it is, as described, the only CEEC that is unambiguously a member of the core. In contrast,
other CEECs that are not yet part of the EA, such as Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania, show very low membership coeﬃcients of
the core, signifying high potential costs of EA accession. Several countries that have already adopted the euro unfortunately
share this pattern, for example the Baltics, Slovakia and Slovenia or countries on the southern periphery, such as Portugal or
Spain. In line with the ﬁndings of Wortmann and Stahl (2016) , this demonstrates that the current composition of the EA is
far from optimal. The countries that could share a common currency with the core are not members of the EA, while others
are part of the EA although membership appears to be costly. 
3.2. The relationship between core and peripheral business cycles 
Having deﬁned the overall degree of belongingness that each country exhibits to the different clusters, we now examine
the relationship between the group-speciﬁc centroid cycles ( Fig. 1 ). A visual inspection of the four peripheral business cycles
in comparison with the core cycle allows the ﬁrst conclusions about the drivers of our clustering results from the previous
section. Compared with the core, the Baltics apparently have business cycles with a much higher amplitude, especially (but
not exclusively) during the immediate crisis period of 20 08/20 09. The eastern periphery, on the other hand, appears to be
largely asynchronous with the core before the global ﬁnancial crisis, while the amplitude was comparable. Since the crisis,
however, the core and the eastern periphery have apparently shared largely similar output gaps. The opposite seems to be
the case for the southern periphery. Its business cycle was apparently very synchronized with the core before the crisis and
has increasingly differed since 2009 (e.g. due to a less severe immediate crisis experience and the ‘double-dip’ recession).
To investigate this relation between the clusters further, we use the European core business cycle of the FCM analysis as a
reference cycle for three time-varying synchronization measures. 
First, we compute the time-varying correlation coeﬃcient ρ i, r ( t ), as proposed by Cerqueira and Martins (2009) and
Cerqueira (2013) , between the time series of the four peripheral clusters and the core time series. 10 Furthermore, we follow
Mink et al. (2012) in distinguishing between two aspects of business cycle synchronization that overlap when only the cor-
relation coeﬃcient between two time series is used. They suggest involving both business cycle synchronicity ϕ ir ( t ), that is,
if the two time series of interest are in the same phase of the business cycle, and business cycle similarity γ ( t ) to compareir 
10 The correlation between time series g i and reference series g r is calculated at each point in time using the following formula: ρi,r (t) = 1 −
1 
2 
( 
g i,t −g¯ i√ 
1 
T 
∑ T 
t=1 ( g i,t −g¯ i ) 2 
− g r,t −g¯ r √ 
1 
T 
∑ T 
t=1 ( d r,t −d¯ r ) 
2 
) 2 . The average of ρ i, r ( t ) over t yields the correlation coeﬃcient between the two time series. Several authors use this 
measure in their studies of business cycle synchronization in Europe. For instance, Gächter and Riedl (2014) compute pair-wise correlations for their sample 
countries, while Belke et al. (2016) additionally use time-varying correlations with an EA (12) reference time series. 
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Fig. 1. C luster centroids. Notes : The ﬁgure depicts the respective cluster centroids (dashed lines) compared with the centroids of the core cluster (dotted 
lines) based on the FCM solution for c = 5 and m = 1.5 over the period 1996 Q1–2015 Q4. 
Fig. 2. Relation of the peripheral business cycles to the core. Notes : The ﬁgure depicts the relation between the centroids of the four peripheral clusters and 
the core. This relation is measured using the following variables (1) ϕ i, C ( t ): business cycle synchronicity (dotted lines), (2) γ i, C ( t ): business cycle similarity 
(dashed lines) and (3) ρ i, C ( t ): time-varying correlation (straight lines). In this case i denotes the respective cluster in comparison with the centroid time 
series of the core, denoted by C . 
 
66the amplitudes of the two business cycles. 11 Fig. 2 compares the three-year moving average 12 of these measures for all fourcluster centroids with the core time series as a reference. This allows us to draw several conclusions. 
11 Business cycle synchronicity φ ir ( t ) and business cycle similarity γ ir ( t ) between time series g i and reference series g r are deﬁned as: φ ir (t) = 
g i (t) g r (t) | g i (t) g r (t) | ; γ ir (t) = 1 −
| g i(t) −g r (t) | ∑ n 
i =1 | g i (t) | /n . 
12 As we are rather interested in the trends of business cycle synchronization than in short-term developments, we concentrate on three-year moving 
averages. In fact, when depicting the indicators of Mink et al. (2012) short-term ﬂuctuations might dominate the ﬁgure if the quarterly time series were 
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67First, the Baltics have a high correlation with the core time series (an overall correlation coeﬃcient of 0.88), which is
around 0.9 for most of the time period. This is remarkable, as our cluster results show that the Baltics form a very distinct
business cycle cluster. The values for business cycle synchronicity and s imilarity offer an explanation for this discrepancy
and conﬁrm our suspicion mentioned above. While the timing of the up- and downswings of the core and Baltic business
cycles coincide (indicated by high synchronicity ), their amplitudes differ widely, which explains the clear distinction between
the Baltics and the core in the clustering. From about 2004 onwards (i.e. since the Baltics’ EU accession), a clear trend of
less similar business cycles, at least in terms of amplitude, is observable. Hence, the business cycle of the Baltics shows an
ambivalent relation to the core: temporal accordance but large differences in amplitude. Since the end of the global ﬁnancial
crisis around 2010, this relationship has changed, with increasing similarity and decreasing s ynchronicity between the Baltics
and the core. 
Second, the business cycle of the eastern periphery relates differently to the core. The correlation between the two time
series remained rather low between the mid-1990s and the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis. Hence, the two business cycles
were largely asynchronous, as further indicated by both low similarity and low synchronicity during that time period. From
2009 onwards, however, this relationship changed. Apparently, the business cycles of the eastern periphery and the core
converged in the aftermath of the global ﬁnancial crisis: the correlation, similarity and (to a lesser extent) synchronicity
increased strongly. The business cycle of the cluster around Bulgaria and Romania developed differently. Their already-low
correlation with the core time series declined signiﬁcantly between 2006 and 2010. Since then the similarity and correlation
have increased while the synchronicity has remained low. 
The convergence of most clusters among the CEECs towards the core conﬁrms the ﬁndings of previous studies on busi-
ness cycle synchronization that detect the convergence of these countries (at least) since the global ﬁnancial crisis as well
(see Kolasa, 2013; Stanisic, 2013; Di Giorgio, 2016 ). Still, there is a high degree of heterogeneity in these developments
among the CEECs. The eastern periphery relates differently to the core from the Baltics, which in turn differ signiﬁcantly
from outlier countries like Romania, Bulgaria and the Czech Republic or Hungary. 
Third, the business cycle of the southern periphery exhibits yet another development in its relation to the core. Between
the mid-1990s and circa 2010, the two time series correlated strongly, while the synchronicity measure showed coinciding
up- and downswings. From the early 20 0 0s onwards, however, the amplitudes of the two business cycles differed increas-
ingly, while the same holds for correlation and synchronicity since 2009. Obviously, the business cycles of the core and the
southern periphery have diverged since the global ﬁnancial crisis. This divergence in the aftermath of the crisis seems to
have driven our clustering results. This is in line with studies focusing on the pre-crisis period and detecting a high degree of
synchronization between the southern periphery and the core during that time ( Camacho et al., 2006 , 2008; Aguiar-Conraria
and Soares, 2011; Pentecôte and Huchet-Bourdon, 2012; Aguiar-Conraria et al., 2013; Lehwald, 2013 ) but also conﬁrms the
ﬁndings of studies that include the post-crisis period ( Gächter et al., 2012 ; Ferroni and Klaus, 2015 ; Degiannakis et al., 2014;
Belke et al., 2016 ). The divergence since 2008 can be seen in the context of the unwinding of the economic balances that
piled up in the pre-crisis period and led to the ‘euro crisis’ in southern Europe ( Baldwin et al., 2015 ). Simultaneous ﬁscal
and banking crises produced the need for deleveraging in both the public and the private sector, reinforcing the growth
crisis in these countries and triggering the divergence of the cyclical ﬂuctuations between the southern periphery and the
core ( European Commission, 2014 ). 13 
3.3. The core and periphery before and after the crisis 
Our analysis above shows that the relationship between the peripheral business cycle clusters and the core exhibits
profound changes between the time period before and that after the crisis. To check whether our overall cluster solutions
are robust with respect to these differences and whether the trends that we identify can be conﬁrmed, we split the time
period into a pre-crisis (1996 Q1–2007 Q4) and a post-crisis period (2008 Q1–2015 Q4). We then conduct separate FCM
analyses for each period and present those solutions in Table 2 that result in the highest average silhouette at different
values of c. 
The ﬁrst point to notice here is that the silhouette values indicate two different numbers of clusters for the two time
periods: in the pre-crisis period a four-cluster solution is superior, while in the post-crisis period c = 3 is the preferred
partition. A core cluster is identiﬁed in both periods as well as a cluster around the Baltics (consisting only of Estonia and
Latvia in the ﬁrst period). The composition of the remaining peripheral clusters, however, changes. While in the pre-crisis
period two separate clusters on the eastern periphery are identiﬁed (one around the Czech Republic; the other around
Croatia and Romania), no such cluster is evident after the crisis at c = 3. Instead, most countries of the former easternused, especially when the compared output gaps are close to zero. Particularly the binary synchronization indicator is thus less appropriate if not used 
with moving averages. 
13 As the focus of the present paper lies on assessing the group pattern of European business cycles, we do not explicitly analyze potential driving forces 
behind these developments. There is, however, a large literature dealing with possible determinants of business cycle synchronization (for a survey, see 
De Haan et al., 2008 ). Primarily, the role of trade linkages has been studied (see, for instance, Inklaar et al. 2008 and Gächter and Riedl, 2014 ), but other 
dimensions, such as the effects of EU and EA membership per se, have been investigated as well ( Goncalves et al., 2009, Christodoulopoulou, 2014, Gächter 
and Riedl, 2014 or Bierbaumer-Polly et al., 2016 ). In a more recent study, Gächter et al. (2017) analyze the role of wage developments. They ﬁnd that wage 
growth divergence led to a reduction of business cycle co-movement within the EA, which might be one explanation for the diverging patterns we ﬁnd 
between the core and the southern periphery. 
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Table 2 
Pre- and post-crisis FCM results (Period 1: 1996 Q1–2007 Q4; Period 2: 2008 Q1–2015 Q4). 
First period (1996 Q1–2007 Q4) Second period (2008 Q1–2015 Q4) 
m = 1.7 CF Cluster 1: Cluster 2: Cluster 3: Cluster 4: South Cluster 1: Cluster 2: Cluster 3: 
ﬁltered data Core Baltics Eastern Periphery Eastern Periphery Core Baltics Southern Periphery 
Austria 0.97 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.90 0.00 0.10 
Belgium 0.88 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.44 0.00 0.56 
Bulgaria 0.18 0.01 0.64 0.16 0.66 0.02 0.31 
Croatia 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.90 0.87 0.01 0.12 
Czech Republic 0.09 0.01 0.87 0.03 0.65 0.00 0.34 
Denmark 0.84 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.88 0.00 0.11 
Estonia 0.02 0.95 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.95 0.02 
Finland 0.80 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.74 0.08 0.17 
France 0.98 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.65 0.00 0.34 
Germany 0.52 0.01 0.38 0.09 0.93 0.00 0.07 
Greece 0.15 0.01 0.11 0.73 0.33 0.04 0.63 
Hungary 0.89 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.81 0.00 0.19 
Ireland 0.24 0.02 0.69 0.06 0.38 0.09 0.53 
Italy 0.92 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.65 0.01 0.34 
Latvia 0.01 0.96 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.97 0.01 
Lithuania 0.18 0.26 0.13 0.43 0.03 0.96 0.02 
Netherlands 0.94 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.80 0.00 0.20 
Norway 0.79 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.39 0.01 0.59 
Poland 0.75 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.22 0.00 0.78 
Portugal 0.77 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.00 0.85 
Romania 0.17 0.03 0.61 0.20 0.54 0.08 0.38 
Slovakia 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.89 0.83 0.02 0.16 
Slovenia 0.30 0.02 0.45 0.23 0.75 0.03 0.22 
Spain 0.66 0.00 0.25 0.08 0.03 0.00 0.97 
Sweden 0.87 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.65 0.02 0.32 
Switzerland 0.88 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.62 0.01 0.38 
United Kingdom 0.89 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.73 0.00 0.27 
Sample average silhouette Sample average silhouette 
0.5382 0.4473 
Notes : The table summarizes the cluster results of our FCM approach of CF-ﬁltered quarterly real GDP for two separate time periods: 1996 Q1–2007 Q4 as 
the ﬁrst and 2008 Q1–2015 Q4 as the second period. The values again express relative membership of each cluster ( u ij ). The highest cluster membership 
is signiﬁed by bold letters. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
68peripheries enter the core cluster, indicating greater proximity than in the ﬁrst period. 14 The clear separation between the
CEECs and the rest of Europe in the pre-crisis period is in line with the ﬁndings of Camacho et al. (20 06 , 20 08 ), who detect
such a division with their cluster analyses. In their analysis of data between 1990 and 2003, the CEECs constitute separate
clusters, while the southern European countries are part of an EU15 cluster. 
Our sample split analysis, however, shows that this pattern has changed, as, in the second period, the southern periphery
cluster is formed around Portugal and Spain, while most of the CEECs enter the core. These results conﬁrm our ﬁndings re-
ported above, as the global ﬁnancial crisis apparently constitutes a structural break in the relationship between the European
core and the periphery. Since then the eastern periphery has converged towards the core while the southern periphery has
diverged, forming a separate cluster. Another remarkable development can be seen for Belgium, Italy and France. All three
countries show very high membership coeﬃcients of the core in the ﬁrst period. Conversely, in the second period, they
belong to the southern periphery to a high degree (Belgium even switches membership). 15 
3.4. Robustness analysis 
The results of a cluster analysis can be sensitive to the speciﬁcations used, such as the selected variables and objects, the
distance measures and the clustering algorithms. Hence, we conduct several additional analyses to test the robustness of our
main results. Speciﬁcally, (1) we vary the ﬁltering method that we employ to extract the output gaps from the GDP series,
(2) we expand our country sample with additional OECD countries, (3) we employ an additional hierarchical clustering
algorithm, (4) we repeat the main FCM analysis with a different distance measure and (5) we exclude the years of the
immediate crisis impact, 20 08/20 09, from our sample split analysis. All ﬁve robustness checks conﬁrm our main results. 14 If, however, the inferior four-cluster solution (silhouette value of 0.29) is used in the second period, an eastern periphery (including Germany to a 
high degree) appears again. Therefore, despite having core membership coeﬃcients between 0.11 and 0.39, this country group cannot be regarded as being 
completely integrated into the core cluster. All the cluster solutions are available on request. 
15 Our robustness checks, however, show that these results disappear for Belgium and France when the immediate crisis periods are omitted from the 
analysis. The result for Italy remains robust (see below). 
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69The ﬁrst robustness check is concerned with the ﬁltering of the original data. In all the main analyses, we employ the
band-pass ﬁlter of Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003 ). Table A1 in the appendix summarizes the results of our cluster analyses,
which are based on output gaps that have been extracted using the high-pass ﬁlter of Hodrick and Prescott (1997 ). In line
with the former results, we ﬁnd a stable core cluster opposed to peripheral clusters that form when the number of clusters
is increased. At c = 3 the country sample is divided into the core, the Baltics and the eastern periphery. While at c = 4
the southern periphery is separated from the core, at c = 5 an outlier cluster forms around Romania and (now to a lesser
degree) Bulgaria. The composition of the clusters remains stable as well. The only exception is the southern periphery, since
Poland and Norway are members of the core (albeit with rather low membership coeﬃcients) and Portugal shows a lower
membership degree of this cluster at c = 5. Apart from these deviations, however, the main results are robust to this change
in the ﬁltering method. 
The same holds for a variation of the country sample. To check whether such a variation changes our cluster member-
ship, we include three additional non-European industrialized OECD countries (Japan, South Korea and the United States).
The results are presented in Appendix Table A2 . We detect a core cluster opposed to clusters on the eastern and south-
ern peripheries and a cluster containing the Baltic States. The latter cluster, however, changes at c = 5, as Lithuania now
constitutes an outlier cluster as opposed to Bulgaria and/or Romania previously. This result might be driven by differences
between Lithuania and the other two Baltic States in the pre-crisis period, as indicated by our results from the sample split.
The US and Japan enter the core cluster, while Korea switches membership at different values of c and hence constitutes an
outlier. These results for the US and Japan are quite interesting, as they indicate a high degree of business cycle synchro-
nization among fully developed industrial nations, regardless of their regional proximity, as for example is also found by
Lehwald (2013) , who conducts a similar robustness check. 
In addition to these variations of the ﬁltering and the country sample, we employ a different clustering algorithm and
distance measure. Although in our view a partitional clustering algorithm such as FCM is better suited to our purposes, we
compare our ﬁndings with those arising from hierarchical clustering (weighted average linkage 16 ). The results are depicted
in a dendrogram ( Table A3 in the Appendix ) indicating that the overall composition of our clusters does not change. The
core cluster is the most obvious group with the smallest within-cluster differences and comprises exactly those twelve
countries that centered the core cluster in our main analysis. The results for the remaining clusters resemble our ﬁndings
as well. The Baltics constitute a separate cluster, furthest away from all the others and exhibiting considerable heterogeneity
within the cluster (especially regarding Lithuania). Furthermore, the hierarchical analysis conﬁrms the existence of clusters
on the southern (again comprising Spain and Portugal as well as Poland and Norway) and the eastern periphery (several
clusters comprising Bulgaria and Romania, Croatia and Slovakia, and the Czech Republic and Slovenia) and conﬁrms that
Greece and Ireland constitute outliers. As the second variation of our clustering method, we repeat our FCM analysis with
another distance measure (Manhattan distance, Table A4 ) and are again able to reproduce our main results. Apart from
smaller deviations in the membership coeﬃcients, the cluster structure and membership resemble our ﬁndings, as we again
detect a stable cluster around the twelve core countries, opposed to the Baltics and the eastern and southern peripheries. 
Lastly, we repeat our sample split analysis and exclude the years 2008 and 2009 to check whether the immediate crisis
impact drives our results for the second (post-crisis) period. That, however, is not the case. The silhouette again indicates
that the three-cluster solution is superior for the post-crisis period. In this solution most countries from the eastern periph-
ery again join the core cluster while the southern periphery cluster is separated from that core. Hence, the main ﬁnding of
the sample split analysis – convergence of the eastern and divergence of the southern periphery – is conﬁrmed. The results
for France and Belgium, however, change, as they are now again unambiguous members of the core cluster. The similar
result for Italy, however, remains robust, since its membership of the core remains rather low, signifying proximity to the
southern periphery in the post-crisis period. 
4. Conclusion 
The recent euro crisis has underlined the need to address European business cycle patterns from a country group per-
spective. Previous research often uses the distinction between the core and the periphery either to analyze cyclical synchro-
nization in arbitrarily predeﬁned groups or to classify countries’ synchronicities with respect to several reference measures.
Differently from these studies, we propose a time series fuzzy clustering approach to assess the core–periphery pattern em-
pirically in a direct manner that does not require strict assumptions. By applying the FCM clustering algorithm to output
gap series of 27 European countries, we identify a core group consisting of Central European countries opposed to several
clusters on the eastern and southern European peripheries along with the representative group-speciﬁc European business
cycles. Both the classiﬁcation and the obtained reference cycles may be used by the literature dealing with business cycle
synchronization. For instance, the detected European core business cycle can be regarded as an anchor cycle for all coun-
tries wishing to share a common currency with the core countries (which mostly have already adopted the euro). We ﬁnd
evidence against using Germany’s business cycle as a proxy for that cycle, as other core countries, like France, follow the16 We choose the weighted average linkage method as it constitutes a compromise between hierarchical methods on the spectrum between the ‘nearest- 
neighbor’ method (single linkage) and the ‘furthest-neighbor’ method (complete linkage, Hastie et al., 2008 ). The results for other hierarchical clustering 
algorithms, however, are in line with our main analysis as well and are available on request. 
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70European core business cycle more closely. Remarkably, this is also true for Italy, which is sometimes classiﬁed as belonging
to the southern European periphery. 
By quantifying each country’s degree of belongingness to all the clusters, our analysis provides useful information about
the cyclical suitability of individual countries for monetary uniﬁcation with the core. While there is certainly more involved
in the decision to enter the EA, the ‘EA’ and ‘EU outs,’ Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK, as well as some CEECs,
especially Hungary and to a lesser degree the Czech Republic and Poland, could adopt the euro at a lower cost than the other
countries on the eastern or southern European periphery. However, while some non-EA members clearly belong to the core,
several peripheral countries with less synchronized cycles have adopted the euro instead (especially Greece, Ireland, Portugal
and Spain). If the EA persists in its current composition, a common monetary policy and exchange rate are thus likely to
remain costly for several members. Conversely, our results show that there are country groups in Europe that qualify as
separate OCAs in terms of business cycle similarities. This pattern, however, changes over time. Our ﬁndings reveal that,
while many CEECs converge towards the core, the southern periphery primarily around Spain and Portugal shows some
divergence since the global ﬁnancial crisis. Obviously, the driving forces behind these developments are of great interest to
scholars and policy makers alike and constitute an interesting topic for future research. 
Appendix 
Tables A1 –A5 . Table A1 
FCM results, output gaps extracted using the Hodrick–Prescott ﬁlter (whole period 1996 Q1–2015 Q4). 
3-Cluster Solution 4-Cluster Solution 5-Cluster Solution 
m = 1.5 HP 
Filtered Data 
Cluster 1: 
Core 
Cluster 2: 
Baltics 
Cluster 3: 
Eastern P. 
Cluster 1: 
Core 
Cluster 2: 
Baltics 
Cluster 3: 
Eastern P. 
Cluster 4: 
Southern P. 
Cluster 1: 
Core 
Cluster 2: 
Baltics 
Cluster 3: 
Eastern P. 
Cluster 4: 
Southern P. 
Cluster 5: 
Bul. and Rom. 
Austria 0.98 0.00 0.02 0.97 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.95 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 
Belgium 0.98 0.00 0.02 0.95 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.92 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.00 
Bulgaria 0.31 0.05 0.64 0.19 0.03 0.50 0.27 0.13 0.02 0.21 0.17 0.47 
Croatia 0.23 0.02 0.75 0.12 0.01 0.66 0.20 0.06 0.01 0.79 0.08 0.06 
Czech Republic 0.38 0.00 0.61 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.77 0.15 0.00 0.12 0.67 0.06 
Denmark 0.95 0.00 0.05 0.85 0.00 0.03 0.12 0.80 0.00 0.04 0.16 0.01 
Estonia 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01 0.96 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.95 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Finland 0.81 0.01 0.18 0.66 0.01 0.11 0.22 0.55 0.01 0.20 0.21 0.03 
France 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.97 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 
Germany 0.93 0.00 0.06 0.86 0.00 0.03 0.10 0.81 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.01 
Greece 0.24 0.02 0.74 0.15 0.01 0.46 0.37 0.13 0.01 0.26 0.28 0.33 
Hungary 0.61 0.01 0.38 0.38 0.00 0.18 0.44 0.35 0.00 0.19 0.39 0.06 
Ireland 0.38 0.08 0.53 0.23 0.05 0.26 0.45 0.20 0.05 0.22 0.36 0.18 
Italy 0.98 0.00 0.02 0.90 0.00 0.01 0.09 0.84 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.00 
Latvia 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Lithuania 0.03 0.93 0.04 0.03 0.88 0.06 0.03 0.03 0.82 0.08 0.03 0.04 
Netherlands 0.95 0.00 0.05 0.81 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.66 0.00 0.03 0.30 0.01 
Norway 0.82 0.01 0.18 0.66 0.01 0.11 0.23 0.57 0.00 0.12 0.26 0.04 
Poland 0.88 0.00 0.12 0.72 0.00 0.06 0.21 0.61 0.00 0.08 0.28 0.02 
Portugal 0.80 0.00 0.19 0.49 0.00 0.08 0.43 0.34 0.00 0.07 0.56 0.03 
Romania 0.18 0.03 0.79 0.09 0.02 0.70 0.19 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.92 
Slovakia 0.29 0.04 0.67 0.16 0.02 0.60 0.21 0.08 0.01 0.73 0.09 0.08 
Slovenia 0.24 0.01 0.75 0.16 0.01 0.36 0.48 0.13 0.00 0.47 0.31 0.09 
Spain 0.56 0.00 0.44 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.91 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.95 0.00 
Sweden 0.91 0.00 0.09 0.74 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.66 0.00 0.07 0.26 0.01 
Switzerland 0.97 0.00 0.03 0.92 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.88 0.00 0.02 0.10 0.01 
United 
Kingdom 
0.91 0.00 0.09 0.79 0.00 0.05 0.16 0.72 0.00 0.07 0.19 0.02 
Sample average silhouette Sample average silhouette Sample average silhouette 
0.4363 0.3517 0.2955 
Notes : The table summarizes the cluster results of our FCM approach of HP-ﬁltered quarterly real GDP (1996 Q1–2015 Q4; m = 1.5; c from 3 to 5). The 
values express relative membership of each cluster ( u ij ). The highest cluster membership is signiﬁed by bold letters. 
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Table A2 
FCM results, including the USA, Japan and Korea (whole period 1996 Q1–2015 Q4). 
3-Cluster Solution 4-Cluster Solution 5-Cluster Solution 
m = 1.5 CF 
ﬁltered data 
Cluster 1: 
Core 
Cluster 2: 
Baltics 
Cluster 3: 
Eastern P. 
Cluster 1: 
Core 
Cluster 2: 
Baltics 
Cluster 3: 
Eastern P. 
Cluster 4: 
Southern P. 
Cluster 1: 
Core 
Cluster 2: 
Baltics 
Cluster 3: 
Eastern P. 
Cluster 4: 
Southern P. 
Cluster 5: 
Lithuania 
Austria 0.96 0.00 0.04 0.96 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.95 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.00 
Belgium 0.97 0.00 0.03 0.67 0.00 0.01 0.31 0.62 0.00 0.01 0.37 0.00 
Bulgaria 0.17 0.01 0.82 0.07 0.00 0.84 0.08 0.07 0.00 0.85 0.08 0.00 
Croatia 0.41 0.02 0.57 0.28 0.01 0.46 0.25 0.29 0.01 0.41 0.27 0.03 
Czech Republic 0.29 0.00 0.71 0.30 0.00 0.32 0.37 0.31 0.00 0.34 0.34 0.00 
Denmark 0.95 0.00 0.05 0.91 0.00 0.01 0.07 0.90 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.00 
Estonia 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.98 0.00 0.00 0.01 
Finland 0.74 0.03 0.23 0.70 0.02 0.12 0.15 0.69 0.01 0.11 0.16 0.03 
France 0.99 0.00 0.01 0.93 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.91 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 
Germany 0.66 0.00 0.33 0.72 0.00 0.12 0.15 0.73 0.00 0.11 0.15 0.00 
Greece 0.41 0.02 0.57 0.22 0.01 0.30 0.47 0.22 0.01 0.30 0.46 0.02 
Hungary 0.91 0.00 0.09 0.76 0.00 0.04 0.20 0.74 0.00 0.03 0.22 0.00 
Ireland 0.47 0.05 0.48 0.29 0.03 0.23 0.44 0.29 0.03 0.23 0.42 0.03 
Italy 0.96 0.00 0.04 0.84 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.83 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.00 
Latvia 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.99 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.03 
Lithuania 0.04 0.92 0.04 0.04 0.87 0.06 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Netherlands 0.93 0.00 0.07 0.77 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.75 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.00 
Norway 0.80 0.00 0.19 0.44 0.00 0.08 0.47 0.41 0.00 0.08 0.51 0.00 
Poland 0.86 0.00 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.04 0.61 0.32 0.00 0.04 0.64 0.00 
Portugal 0.73 0.00 0.27 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.79 0.17 0.00 0.04 0.79 0.00 
Romania 0.19 0.02 0.79 0.09 0.01 0.77 0.13 0.09 0.01 0.77 0.11 0.02 
Slovakia 0.24 0.02 0.75 0.13 0.01 0.74 0.12 0.15 0.01 0.68 0.14 0.03 
Slovenia 0.21 0.01 0.79 0.20 0.01 0.63 0.16 0.22 0.00 0.60 0.17 0.01 
Spain 0.54 0.00 0.46 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.95 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.94 0.00 
Sweden 0.87 0.00 0.12 0.77 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.77 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.00 
Switzerland 0.90 0.00 0.10 0.71 0.00 0.04 0.24 0.69 0.00 0.04 0.27 0.00 
United 
Kingdom 
0.96 0.00 0.04 0.84 0.00 0.02 0.14 0.81 0.00 0.02 0.17 0.00 
United States 0.94 0.00 0.05 0.76 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.73 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.00 
Japan 0.77 0.00 0.22 0.60 0.00 0.10 0.30 0.59 0.00 0.09 0.31 0.00 
South Korea 0.43 0.02 0.54 0.30 0.02 0.27 0.42 0.29 0.01 0.28 0.40 0.02 
Sample average silhouette Sample average silhouette Sample average silhouette 
0.4188 0.3088 0.3100 
Notes : The table summarizes the cluster results of our FCM approach of CF-ﬁltered quarterly real GDP (1996 Q1–2015 Q4; m = 1.5; c from 3 to 5) including 
the United States, Japan and South Korea. The values express relative membership of each cluster ( u ij ). The highest cluster membership is signiﬁed by bold 
letters. 
Table A3 
Results for hierarchical clustering using weighted average linkage and the Euclidian distance norm (whole period 1996 Q1–2015 Q4). 
Notes : The dendrogram summarizes the cluster results of a weighted average linkage clustering approach based on the Euclidean distance norm and CF- 
ﬁltered quarterly real GDP (1996 Q1–2015 Q4). 
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Table A4 
FCM results based on the Manhattan distance norm (whole period 1996 Q1–2015 Q4). 
3-Cluster Solution 4-Cluster Solution 5-Cluster Solution 
m = 1.6 CF 
ﬁltered data 
Cluster 1: 
Core 
Cluster 2: 
Baltics 
Cluster 3: 
Eastern P. 
Cluster 1: 
Core 
Cluster 2: 
Baltics 
Cluster 3: 
Eastern P. 
Cluster 4: 
Southern P. 
Cluster 1: 
Core 
Cluster 2: 
Baltics 
Cluster 3: 
Eastern P. 
Cluster 4: 
Southern P. 
Cluster 5: 
Romania 
Austria 0.96 0.00 0.04 0.93 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.92 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.00 
Belgium 0.95 0.00 0.05 0.65 0.00 0.02 0.33 0.65 0.00 0.04 0.31 0.00 
Bulgaria 0.14 0.01 0.86 0.06 0.00 0.88 0.06 0.15 0.01 0.42 0.15 0.27 
Croatia 0.31 0.02 0.67 0.30 0.02 0.46 0.23 0.06 0.00 0.87 0.05 0.02 
Czech Republic 0.60 0.01 0.38 0.36 0.01 0.15 0.48 0.32 0.01 0.11 0.51 0.06 
Denmark 0.93 0.00 0.06 0.85 0.00 0.02 0.12 0.85 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.00 
Estonia 0.02 0.96 0.02 0.02 0.95 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.95 0.01 0.01 0.01 
Finland 0.81 0.04 0.16 0.70 0.02 0.08 0.20 0.63 0.02 0.14 0.18 0.02 
France 0.97 0.00 0.03 0.86 0.00 0.01 0.13 0.87 0.00 0.01 0.11 0.00 
Germany 0.76 0.01 0.23 0.69 0.01 0.08 0.22 0.63 0.00 0.13 0.22 0.01 
Greece 0.34 0.03 0.63 0.22 0.02 0.37 0.38 0.19 0.02 0.37 0.29 0.14 
Hungary 0.91 0.00 0.08 0.77 0.00 0.03 0.20 0.75 0.00 0.06 0.19 0.01 
Ireland 0.56 0.06 0.38 0.33 0.04 0.18 0.45 0.29 0.03 0.14 0.43 0.11 
Italy 0.96 0.00 0.03 0.79 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.77 0.00 0.02 0.21 0.00 
Latvia 0.01 0.98 0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97 0.01 0.01 0.00 
Lithuania 0.07 0.83 0.10 0.09 0.73 0.11 0.07 0.09 0.61 0.18 0.07 0.06 
Netherlands 0.95 0.00 0.05 0.76 0.00 0.02 0.22 0.73 0.00 0.02 0.24 0.00 
Norway 0.76 0.01 0.23 0.49 0.01 0.11 0.40 0.46 0.01 0.16 0.34 0.03 
Poland 0.82 0.01 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.05 0.57 0.37 0.00 0.08 0.53 0.01 
Portugal 0.67 0.01 0.32 0.24 0.00 0.07 0.69 0.24 0.00 0.08 0.66 0.02 
Romania 0.18 0.03 0.79 0.09 0.02 0.78 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 
Slovakia 0.22 0.01 0.77 0.19 0.01 0.67 0.13 0.06 0.00 0.88 0.04 0.03 
Slovenia 0.35 0.01 0.63 0.32 0.01 0.34 0.33 0.26 0.01 0.39 0.28 0.06 
Spain 0.62 0.00 0.38 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.95 0.03 0.00 0.01 0.96 0.00 
Sweden 0.90 0.01 0.09 0.73 0.01 0.04 0.23 0.70 0.00 0.06 0.23 0.01 
Switzerland 0.86 0.00 0.14 0.63 0.00 0.06 0.31 0.63 0.00 0.06 0.30 0.01 
United 
Kingdom 
0.90 0.00 0.10 0.78 0.00 0.04 0.18 0.76 0.00 0.08 0.16 0.01 
Sample average silhouette Sample average silhouette Sample average silhouette 
0.4419 0.3088 0.3470 
Notes : The table summarizes the cluster results of our FCM approach of CF-ﬁltered quarterly real GDP (1996 Q1–2015 Q4; m = 1.6; c from 3 to 5) using the 
‘Manhattan distance.’ The values express relative membership of each cluster ( u ij ). The highest cluster membership is signiﬁed by bold letters. 
Table A5 
Pre- and post-crisis FCM results, excluding 20 08/20 09 (Period 1: 1996 Q1–2007 Q4; Period 2: 2010 Q1–2015 Q4). 
First period (1996 Q1–2007 Q4) Second period (2010 Q1–2015 Q4) 
m = 1.7 (period 1) 1.9 (2) Cluster 1: Cluster 2: Cluster 3: Cluster 4: South Cluster 1: Cluster 2: Cluster 3: 
CF ﬁltered data Core Baltics Eastern Periphery Eastern Periphery Core Baltics Southern Periphery 
Austria 0.97 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.90 0.02 0.08 
Belgium 0.88 0.00 0.07 0.05 0.84 0.01 0.16 
Bulgaria 0.18 0.01 0.64 0.16 0.87 0.02 0.11 
Croatia 0.06 0.01 0.03 0.90 0.88 0.02 0.10 
Czech Republic 0.09 0.01 0.87 0.03 0.27 0.01 0.72 
Denmark 0.84 0.01 0.10 0.04 0.92 0.01 0.07 
Estonia 0.02 0.95 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.92 0.03 
Finland 0.80 0.02 0.09 0.10 0.73 0.08 0.19 
France 0.98 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.95 0.00 0.04 
Germany 0.52 0.01 0.38 0.09 0.91 0.01 0.08 
Greece 0.15 0.01 0.11 0.73 0.41 0.09 0.50 
Hungary 0.89 0.01 0.06 0.05 0.67 0.02 0.31 
Ireland 0.24 0.02 0.69 0.06 0.34 0.15 0.51 
Italy 0.92 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.56 0.02 0.42 
Latvia 0.01 0.96 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.92 0.03 
Lithuania 0.18 0.26 0.13 0.43 0.06 0.91 0.03 
Netherlands 0.94 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.87 0.01 0.12 
Norway 0.79 0.01 0.09 0.11 0.76 0.04 0.19 
Poland 0.75 0.01 0.13 0.11 0.64 0.01 0.34 
Portugal 0.77 0.01 0.12 0.11 0.20 0.02 0.79 
Romania 0.17 0.03 0.61 0.20 0.67 0.06 0.28 
Slovakia 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.89 0.94 0.00 0.05 
( continued on next page ) 
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Table A5 ( continued ) 
First period (1996 Q1–2007 Q4) Second period (2010 Q1–2015 Q4) 
m = 1.7 (period 1) 1.9 (2) Cluster 1: Cluster 2: Cluster 3: Cluster 4: South Cluster 1: Cluster 2: Cluster 3: 
CF ﬁltered data Core Baltics Eastern Periphery Eastern Periphery Core Baltics Southern Periphery 
Slovenia 0.30 0.02 0.45 0.23 0.60 0.03 0.38 
Spain 0.66 0.00 0.25 0.08 0.06 0.00 0.93 
Sweden 0.87 0.01 0.08 0.04 0.46 0.03 0.51 
Switzerland 0.88 0.00 0.09 0.03 0.83 0.02 0.15 
United Kingdom 0.89 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.92 0.01 0.07 
Sample average silhouette Sample average silhouette 
0.5382 0.5592 
Notes : The table summarizes the cluster results of our FCM approach of CF-ﬁltered quarterly real GDP for two separate time periods: 1996 Q1–2007 Q4 
as the ﬁrst and 2010 Q1–2015 Q4 as the second period. The values express relative membership of each cluster ( u ij ). The highest cluster membership is 
signiﬁed by bold letters. 
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Abstract 
The literature on international business cycles has employed dynamic factor models to 
disentangle global from group-specific and national factors in countries’ macroeconomic 
aggregates. Therefore, the countries have simply been classified ex ante as belonging to the 
same region or the same level of development. This paper estimates a DFM for a sample of 
106 countries and three variables (output, consumption, investment) over the period 1960 to 
2014, in which the countries are classified according to the outcome of a cluster analysis. By 
comparing the results with those obtained by the previous grouping approaches, we show 
substantial deviations in the importance of global and group-specific factors. Remarkably, 
when the groups are defined properly, the ‘global business cycle’ accounts for only a very 
small fraction of macroeconomic fluctuations, most evidently in the industrialized world. The 
group-specific factors, on the other hand, play a much greater role for national business cycles 
than previously thought – also in the pre-globalization period. 
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1. Introduction 
The globalization of trade and financial linkages over the past decades coincided with many 
regional and group-specific integration processes affecting countries’ economic developments 
to varying degrees. As the severity and recovery time of globally experienced shocks have 
differed more significantly across such country groups since the financial crisis of 2008/9, one 
might expect a shift in the relative importance of international factors for domestic business 
cycles. To quantify each country’s vulnerability to foreign developments on different levels, 
the empirical literature has decomposed national macroeconomic fluctuations into global, 
group-specific, and country-specific factors using large-scale dynamic factor models (DFM). 
The seminal work of Kose et al. (2003) found evidence of a ‘global business cycle’ 
dominating the importance of seven regional cycles when conducting a DFM with 60 
countries and three macroeconomic aggregates over the period 1960 to 1990. Somewhat later, 
Helbling et al. (2007) repeated this exercise with an enlarged database of 90 countries in the 
period from 1960 to 2005, and found the relevance of the global cycle to have declined in the 
later part, while regional shocks have become more important, especially in North America, 
Europe, and Asia. The growing importance of regional factors relative to the global factor is 
underlined by Mumtaz et al. (2011), who conducted a DFM with output and inflation rates for 
36 countries over more than 75 years. Based on an extended dataset of 23 industrialized 
economies (IEs), 24 emerging markets (EMs), and 59 developing countries (DEs) covering 
the period 1960 to 2008, Kose et al. (2012) found that the global business cycle has become 
less relevant for the IEs and EMs since the ‘globalization era’ starting in the mid-1980s. On 
the other hand, the group-specific factors have henceforth gained importance for these country 
groups, indicating a ‘decoupling’ of countries from the global business cycle. By partitioning 
this data of 106 countries into seven regions, Hirata et al. (2013) amend the previous results, 
stating that “the recent era of globalization has witnessed the emergence of regional business 
cycles.” Ductor and Leiva-Leon (2016), conversely, show with their time-varying DFM that 
the sensitivity of most EMs’ business cycles to the global factor has rather increased over 
recent times.  
A crucial limitation of the studies listed above is that the group-specific factors are statically 
modeled as either common to the countries of a particular world region (Kose et al. 2003; 
Hirata et al. 2013) or at the same level of development (Kose et al. 2012). The underlying 
group compositions are set ex ante and, in the latter case, do not account for any time 
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variation over the pre- and the globalization periods considered. By doing so, the applied 
DFM will only verify the potential role played by very specific common factors suspected to 
permanently exist in any of these country groups. If, however, the continually changing trade 
linkages have rather entailed cyclical interdependencies among country groups of different 
shapes or even within smaller sub-groups, the importance of any pre-specified group factor 
for domestic cycles may be significantly misinterpreted. Imagine, for example, the suspected 
‘European business cycle’ is found to exhibit only weak explanatory power compared with 
the ‘global business cycle’ for all the European countries (Kose et al. 2003), this may simply 
hide the fact that some countries (like e.g. the UK and Ireland) may rather belong to a 
transatlantic cluster together with the USA and Canada, and that the DFM should thus 
account for two distinct group-specific factors, one Central European and one inter-regional 
Anglo-Saxon.  
The only paper considering this problem of DFM is that of Francis et al. (2017), stressing 
indeed that imposing factors in a DFM, that are not in the data implies a misspecification and 
may lead to factor estimates and hence variance decompositions that deviate substantially 
from the true model. Francis et al. (2017) determine the number and the composition of the 
groups endogenously based on series-level covariates.1 In fact, the ‘optimal’ groups found by 
their approach do not correspond to the seven regions of the world presumed by Kose et al. 
(2003) and there are significant differences in the resulting variance decompositions, too. 
When they estimate their DFM based on three endogenously classified country groups, the 
group-specific factors explain, on average, about 23% of macroeconomic fluctuations, 
compared with less than 3% found by Kose et al. (2003). The comparability of such results, 
however, is limited, because different from the study of Kose et al. (2003), only GDP data for 
60 countries were used and, hence, no country factors were estimated. This extension is left 
for future research by the authors and therefore considered in the present paper. Moreover, 
their clustering of countries is based on ‘covariate data,’ limiting the applicability for larger 
global datasets and thus requiring a different grouping approach. To cope with this problem, 
we conduct a hierarchical cluster analysis that reveals the business cycle data-inherent 
grouping structure before estimating a DFM. This two-step approach does not require any 
more variables than those used in the DFM and therefore allows us to analyze large-scale 
                                                          
1
 List of covariates: (i) the degree of economic openness, defined as the ratio of imports and exports to GDP; (ii) investment 
share of real GDP; (iii) an index of conflict resolution and sophistication of the legal system as captured by the manner in 
which lower courts facilitate landlords’ collection of checks (and remedies for bounced checks); (iv) an index of language 
diversity within each country; (v) an index of production dispersion relative to the rest of the world; (vi) an index of export 
dispersion from each country’s exporting partners; and (vii) a similar index of import dispersion from each country’s 
importing partners. 
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datasets.  
In particular, the present paper adds to the literature by assessing the relevance of the global 
and the group-specific factors when the original DFM designed by Kose et al. (2003/2012) is 
applied to the same (time-extended) global dataset of 106 countries and three macroeconomic 
aggregates and the number of groups as well as their compositions are varied. Thereby, the 
variance decompositions arising from the DFM based on the pre-specified groupings 
supposed by Kose et al. (2012) and Hirata et al. (2013) are directly compared with those for 
which the grouping pattern has been drawn from the cluster analysis. This approach is not 
only independent from ‘covariates’ but provides direct insights into the hierarchical country 
group pattern of global business cycles, proving the existence of any business cycle cluster 
rather than assuming it beforehand. Moreover, as such group pattern is likely to have changed 
over time, we additionally estimate the DFM for the pre- and the globalization periods using 
the respective data-based grouping structures in order to gain a better understanding of the 
previously detected ‘decoupling’ and ‘regionalization’ trends.  
The main findings can be summarized as follows. The formerly used regional as well as the 
development-based ex ante country groupings are found inaccurate, most evidently for the 
pre-globalization period. By contrast, the data-based grouping is a mix of both, with regional 
cyclical similarities most dominant in Central Europe, South East Asia, parts of Latin 
America but, otherwise, often limited to some direct neighbor countries. An Anglo-Saxon 
cluster rather provides evidence of inter-regional cyclical linkages resulting most likely from 
historical connections between these countries. The formerly used grouping based on the 
levels of development is most apparent between most IEs of the sample and all the other 
countries, of which the EMs and DEs should not be separated accordingly. 
When the DFM is estimated based on the underlying cyclical similarities revealed by the 
cluster analysis, the relevance of the group-specific factors is found to be much higher than 
that based on the previously used groupings. On the other hand, the contribution of the global 
factor becomes, on average, negligible and very much limited to the IEs. The deviations in the 
relative importance of these two factors are found to be even more substantial for individual 
country groups like the G-7, USA/CAN, and the EU-12. 
Despite finding evidence in support of the regionalization trend and the decoupling hypothesis 
(growing importance of intra-group factors, declining relevance of the global factor over 
time), we show that, when the groups have been defined properly, the group-specific factors 
already exhibit almost equal importance as the global factor in the pre-globalization period. 
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This indicates – in line with our findings from the cluster analysis – that the country groups 
previously supposed by Kose et al. (2012) and Hirata et al. (2013) simply did not exist at least 
before the mid-1980s, resulting in an incorrect estimate of the relative contribution of the 
global and the group-specific factors in these studies. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the DFM and the 
clustering method that we employ as well as the dataset. The results of the cluster analysis 
and those of the DFM due to the different country group specifications are presented in 
Section 3 for the full sample period. We also assess the implications for the ‘decoupling’ and 
‘regionalization’ notions by conducting the DFM for the two sub-periods using the respective 
data-based grouping structure. In Section 4, we draw some conclusions.    
 
2. Methodology and Data 
The Model 
Consider a hierarchical dynamic factor model with multiple observed variables per country 
and multiple unobserved factors similar to Kose et al. (2003, 2012). More specifically, our 
factor model contains a global factor common to all variables in all countries denoted by ܨ௧�௟௢௕௔௟, group-specific factors that are common to all countries and variables in a given group 
of countries denoted by ܨ௧,௝��௢௨௣, and country-specific factors, ܨ௧,௞ common to all variables in 
country k. The DFM takes the form, ݕ௜,௧ =  ߙ௜ܨ௧�௟௢௕௔௟ + ∑ ߚ௜,௝ܨ௧,௝��௢௨௣ெ௝=ଵ + ∑ ߛ௜,௞ܨ௧,௞஼௢௨௡௧��ே௞=ଵ + �௜,௧ ,    � = ͳ, … , � × �,  t = ͳ, … , ܶ, (1) 
where M denotes the number of groups, N is the number of countries, and K denotes the 
variables per country. Each observed variable ݕ௜,௧ is explained by the global factor with 
loading ߙ௜, by a group-specific factor with loading ߚ௜,௝, by its country factor with loading ߛ௜,௞, 
and an idiosyncratic component �௜,௧. As is common in the literature on the international 
business cycle, we impose a hierarchical structure, i.e. all countries and variables load on the 
global factor but each country only belongs to one group. As a consequence, some loadings in ߚ௜,௝ and ߛ௜,௞ are restricted to be equal to zero, as the observed variables do not load on every 
group and country factor. 
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The model is completed by assuming stochastic laws of motion for all unobserved factors. 
Following Kose et al. (2003, 2012), we assume all factors in eq. (1) to follow zero-mean 
AR(3) processes, ܨ௧� =  ∑ ܨ௧−௟�ଷ௟=ଵ +  �௧� , �௧�~��݀ �ሺͲ, ���ଶ ሻ ,   (2) 
for V = 1 + M + N. Similarly, all idiosyncratic components are assumed to follow zero-mean 
AR(3) processes, �௜,௧  =  ∑ �௜,௧ଷ௟=ଵ +  �௧ ,  �௧  ~��݀ �ሺͲ, ��ଶሻ ,   (3) 
As it stands, the model given by eqs. (1)-(3) is not identified without further restrictions as 
neither the signs nor the scales of the factors and the factor loadings are separately identified.2 
Scale identification is achieved by normalizing the variance of the factor innovations to some 
positive constant c, i.e., we set ���ଶ = ܿ.3 Sign identification is achieved by restricting one of 
the factor loadings on each factor to be positive. 
The model given by eqs. (1)-(3) can be cast in state space form and estimated using the 
Kalman filter and maximum likelihood techniques. This is not the approach pursued in this 
paper. The fairly large number of unknown parameters in combination with the large number 
of unobserved states makes the numerical optimization of the sample log-likelihood function 
quite tedious. Therefore, we analyze the state space model from a Bayesian point of view 
using a Gibbs sampler. The Gibbs sampler is a Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) method 
that simplifies drawing sequences of observations from the joint and marginal posterior 
distributions of the unknown parameters and the unobserved states by iteratively drawing 
states and parameters from their conditional distributions. Intuitively, this amounts to 
reducing sampling from the more complex joint distribution to a sequence of blocks for 
subsets of parameters/states which are easier to sample conditional on the other blocks in the 
sequence. For details of the exact implementation we refer to Kose et al. (2003) and Otrok 
and Whiteman (1998). 
 
 
                                                          
2
 The scale problem in dynamic factor models refers to the fact that it is possible to multiply the common factors and 
corresponding loadings by any constant without changing their product. Further, the sign of the factors and their loadings are 
not jointly identified, since the likelihood remains the same when both are multiplied by -1. 
3
 Similar to Kose et al. (2003, 2012), the constant c is chosen based on the average innovation variance of a set of univariate 
autoregressions on each variable ݕ௜,௧. 
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Determining the country groups 
Prior to estimating the DFM, we determine the number and the compositions of the country 
groups. Following Ductor and Leiva-Leon (2016), we choose the Ward clustering method for 
partitioning the country sample, as it is one of the most frequently used standard clustering 
procedures and tends to form clusters of equal sizes, which enhances economic interpretation 
of business cycle groups. Ward’s clustering method successively merges countries and 
clusters according to the minimal increase in the error sum of squares within a newly formed 
cluster that can be calculated using  
ܧܵ�௝ = ∑ ∑ሺݔ௞௧௝ −  ̅ݔ௧௝ሻ²�௧=ଵ௡�௞=ଵ  (4) 
with �௝  being the number of countries in cluster j, ݔ௞௧௝ denoting observation in t of country k 
in cluster j, and ̅ݔ௧௝ denoting the mean of observations at t in cluster j. The recursive algorithm 
starts with merging the pair of countries (i and h) with the smallest squared Euclidean 
distance between them: 
݀ =  ∑ሺݔ௜௧ − ݔℎ௧ሻଶ�௧=ଵ  (5) 
where ݔ௜/ℎ௧ is the observation in t of countries i and h. At each step of the following 
procedure, the distance between a newly created cluster of countries B+C and any other 
country A can be recalculated using: 
ܦሺA; B + Cሻ = ͳ�஺ + �஻ + �஼  ∗ {ሺ�஺ + �஻ሻ ∗ ݀ሺܣ; ܤሻ + ሺ�஺ + �஼ሻ ∗ ݀ሺܣ; ܥሻ −  �஺∗ ݀ሺܤ; ܥሻ} (6) 
with �஺, �஻, �஼ denoting the number of objects in clusters A, B, and C. Note that these 
distances correspond to twice the increase of the sum of squares within the formed clusters. 
The hierarchical clustering allows to take the country grouping obtained at any level of 
aggregation. For the interpretation of the final results, however, it might be interesting to 
know what number of clusters should be optimally assumed. This is especially important 
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when comparing the results of the first with the second period, as within both time periods 
different numbers of clusters might fit the data just as well. For the determination of an 
optimal number of clusters, we consider the two widely used cluster stopping rules developed 
by Calinski and Harabasz (1974) and Duda and Hart (1973), which were found to perform 
best among many others (for an overview and application test, see Milligan and Cooper 
1985). We compute the values on a range between three and ten possible clusters, as two 
clusters appear too few and more than the square root of n too many for reasonable economic 
interpretation. The higher the values of both indices the more distinct is the clustering. Results 
can be seen in the Appendix Table A2.  
Data  
For reasons of comparability, we create the same global dataset of 106 countries and three 
macroeconomic aggregates (real GDP, real consumption, and real investment) that has been 
used in the literature. All data have been obtained from Penn World Table 9.0 covering an 
extended time period of annual observations from 1960 to 2014. We use the aggregates with 
constant prices expressed in local currencies and compute the growth rates for each time 
series. For the cluster analysis, the data have been z-standardized in order to achieve an equal 
weighting. The DFM is then estimated with demeaned growth series in line with Kose et al. 
(2012). To compare the results due to different country group specifications, the sample can 
be partitioned into the seven regional groups (North America (NA); Europe; Oceania; Asia; 
Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC); Middle East and North Africa (MENA); and Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA)) used by Hirata et al. (2013), as well as into the three development-
based groups (23 IEs, 24 EMs, 59 DEs) set by Kose et al. (2012). A detailed list of the 
countries of each group can be found in the Appendix. Following these authors, we also 
divide the sample into the pre-globalization period (1960-1984) and the globalization period 
(1985-2014) in order to reassess the previously detected ‘decoupling’ and ‘regionalization’ 
trends based on different country groupings. 
 
3. Results  
The country group pattern of international business cycles  
Figure 1 shows the hierarchical grouping structure of the business cycle data for the full 
sample period in the form of a dendrogram. Starting with 106 individual country clusters at 
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the bottom, countries and clusters are successively merged using Ward’s clustering method 
until only one cluster is left. The most obvious division arising is that between all the IEs on 
the left side, and the EMs and DEs together on the right side of the dendrogram. When the 
sample is further partitioned into three clusters, the latter two country groups can, however, 
not be clearly separated as supposed by Kose et al. (2012). Whereas, for instance, many of the 
Central American DEs are grouped into the second cluster also containing the majority of the 
24 EMs of the sample, some mainly South Asian EMs (e.g. China, India, Egypt, Pakistan, 
Jordan) rather belong to the third cluster of otherwise mostly African DEs.  
Moving further to the bottom of the dendrogram by separating four, five, six, and seven 
clusters reveals some regional similarities in the data, most evidently in Central Europe, 
Southeast Asia, Latin America, and parts of Africa. When seven clusters are supposed the 
country groups can roughly be labelled as the following: 1. Cluster: ‘Central Europe’; 2. 
Cluster: ‘Anglo-Saxon’; 3. Cluster: ‘Latin America’; 4. Cluster: ‘Southeast Asia’, 5. Cluster: 
‘South Asia and Africa’; 6. Cluster: ‘Middle East and Africa’; 7. Cluster: ‘Africa’. The group 
compositions, however, do not correspond to the seven regions that have been set by Hirata et 
al. (2013). For instance, countries of North America (USA and Canada) and Oceania (New 
Zealand and Australia) rather form a common cluster together with Anglo-Saxon and 
Northern European countries (Ireland, UK, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland), providing 
evidence of inter-regional cyclical commonalities that were similarly found between these 
groups by the clustering approaches of Ductor and Leiva-Leon (2016) and Francis et al. 
(2017), but based on different and smaller databases. The only clusters found to comprise 
almost exclusively countries of the same region are the first cluster of Central European 
countries and the fourth cluster of Southeast Asian economies. Interestingly, Japan in fact is 
not grouped with its regional neighbors but with the European countries, indicating stronger 
commonalities between these IEs.  
In sum, the country group pattern obtained by the clustering approach reveals cyclical 
similarities different from what has been previously supposed in the DFM conducted by Kose 
et al. (2012) and Hirata et al. (2013). The grouping structure of the data is rather a mix of 
both, carrying implications for the DFM conducted in the next section. Regarding the optimal 
number of clusters, we find no clear evidence as to how many groups should be used (see 
Table A2 in the Appendix). While the first index does not indicate any superior cluster 
solution as its values decrease continually with the number of clusters, the Duda-Hart Index 
prefers the three-cluster solution over the others. Thus, one first result is that the assumed 
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number of clusters used by Kose et al. (2012) seems more accurate than that of Hirata et al. 
(2013), but in either case the group compositions do not fit the data. In the following section, 
we use both the three- and the seven cluster solutions, allowing us to directly compare our 
results regarding the importance of group factors based on an equivalent number of clusters.  
Figure 1: Hierarchical grouping structure (1960 – 2014) 
The importance of the group specification in DFM 
Figure 2 depicts the posterior mean of the global and the group-specific factors together with 
the respective 5% and 95% quantile bands of the estimates of the DFM when seven groups 
have been set according to the dendrogram. We show this specification, as the group-specific 
factors can be interpreted more easily from clusters containing smaller intuitive country 
groups with less variation.  
It can be seen in the upper left panel that the global factor captures some major economic 
events that have been experienced all around the world. For example, the drastic downturns 
following the oil crises of 1973/74 and 1979 are as clearly visible as the recession in the 
1990s and the reversing dynamic in the beginning of the 2000s. By contrast, the immediate 
impact of the more recent financial crises is rather captured by the first four group-specific 
factors comprising primarily European, Anglo-Saxon, Latin American, and Southeast Asian 
countries, respectively. While the recessions of 2008/9 were most pronounced in Europe 
(Cluster 1) and the Anglo-Saxon countries (Cluster 2), many of these countries also 
experienced another prolonged downswing visible after the first recovery phase, indicating a 
so-called double dip recession. The other group-specific factors as well as the global factor 
evolved somewhat differently during that time. Overall, this may be interpreted consistent 
with the presumption of recently declining importance of the global factor due to more group-
specific economic developments. Specific regional events such as the Asian crisis in the late 
1990s, for example, are captured by the group factor of Cluster 4.    
Figure 2: Global and group-specific factors (1960 – 2014) 
Table 1 shows the variance decompositions from the DFM conducted with different group 
specifications. Columns 1 and 3 for each variable present the results of the DFM using the 
country classifications of Kose et al. (2012) and Hirata et al. (2013), respectively. In columns 
2 and 4, we report the variances explained that are calculated from the DFM based on the 
corresponding clustering of the previous section.  
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When three groups are assumed based on the levels of development, for all 106 countries, the 
global factor, on average, accounts for a remarkable fraction of output- (9.1%), consumption- 
(9.6%), and – to a lesser degree – investment (4.1%) growth variability (Column 1). For the 
case of seven regions (Column 3), these numbers are even higher (10.2%, 10.3%, and 4.7%), 
indicating the importance of the grouping structure that has been set beforehand. These 
figures, however, hide a substantial variation across different subsets of countries, with a 
much higher variance explained among the IEs. For instance, the global factor in Columns 1 
and 3, on average, accounts for 25% and 29.1% of the output variability in the IEs, while it 
only explains 5.7% and 4.3% and 6.4% and 4.4% of the volatility of GDP growth rates among 
the EMs and DEs, respectively. By contrast, for all three variables and all subsets of 
countries, the global factor’s importance decreases dramatically when the groups are specified 
according to the cyclic similarities of the countries (Columns 2 and 4), implying that, if there 
is a ‘global business cycle’, its relevance in fact is very much limited to the industrialized 
world (and most significant in consumption growth). While for the whole sample, the 
contribution of the global factor shrinks to, on average, about 5.2% or 4.4% of the output 
variability in the second and fourth models, within the latter group of countries, it still 
accounts for 11.5% or 8.5%. This drop by just about a half in world average of the global 
factor’s relative importance is similarly found for consumption and investment growth rates. 
However, the deviations between the models are even more pronounced for the G-7 countries 
with the average output variance explained varying between 33.4% in the third and 7.8% in 
the fourth model. Similarly, the global factor’s importance for, say, output volatility differs 
substantially for important countries like the USA and Canada, depending on whether they are 
grouped together with all other IEs of the sample (21%), with Mexico on a regional basis 
(23.8%), or with the cluster members of the equivalent cluster numbers (9.2% or 5.1%).  
Conversely, and in line with Francis et al. (2017), we find that, overall, the group-specific 
factors gain importance when the countries are classified according to their cyclical similarity. 
For the results obtained with three development-related groups, the group-specific factors, on 
average, explain 11.1%, 6.4%, and 9.4% of all the countries’ macroeconomic fluctuations, 
respectively (Column 1). Assuming seven regions instead, the regional component captures 
14.8%, 7.7%, and 9.9% of the variability of output, consumption, and investment growth 
rates, respectively (Column 3). Finally, when the underlying classification is based on the 
corresponding clusters drawn from the dendrogram (Columns 2 and 4), the group-specific 
factors account for a larger fraction of the variability of output (14.5% or 18.8%), 
consumption (9.0% or 13.6%), and investment (11% or 12.5%) growth rates. Again, these 
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average deviations may seem small, but are based on a sample of 106 countries and differ 
substantially across many subsets: For instance, the fraction of output growth attributable to 
the group-specific factors of the USA and Canada varies between 15% of the IE-factor, 49% 
of the regional factor, and between 26.6% and 60.4% of the corresponding cluster-specific 
factors. Similarly, the ‘European business cycle’, which loads over all 18 sample countries of 
the European continent, explains, on average, 20.3% of the output variation of the EU-12 
countries, compared with 43.7% or 48.3% of the average EU-12 country’s output growth 
captured by the cluster-specific factors. 
Besides the deviations in the relative importance of global and group-specific factors, we find 
that the overall contribution of international factors relative to the domestic and idiosyncratic 
components does not change much at world average. 
Table 1: Variance decompositions using different country groupings for the full sample 
period (1960 - 2014) 
Changing country group pattern and implications for the ‘decoupling’ trend 
After having shown the importance of properly specifying the group-specific factors for the 
full sample, we now turn to the country group patterns that have been established in the pre- 
and the globalization eras. Moreover, by assuming the optimal number of clusters in each 
period, we gain a better understanding of the extent of ‘decoupling’ of IEs and EMs or the 
‘regionalization’ that has been detected by the literature.  
Figure 3 illustrates the dendrograms obtained by the cluster analyses of each period. For the 
pre-globalization period, the grouping of countries does not much reflect the previous 
assumptions of seven regional or three development-driven group-specific business cycles. 
Specific regional commonalities are most visible in the first European cluster at the two-
cluster-level, and otherwise limited to North and Central America and some neighboring 
countries at lower aggregation levels. There is also a clear division among the IEs, as, for 
instance, the USA, Canada, and the UK are found to be separated from the European IEs and 
Japan. For most groups, there seems to exist no obvious economic explanation as to why 
member countries share cyclic commonalities, suggesting either stronger global trade linkages 
or coincidence. That said, it may be no surprise why the group-specific factors imposed by 
Kose et al. (2003/2012) and Hirata et al. (2013) explain only a negligible fraction of 
macroeconomic growth rates in the pre-globalization period.  
Figure 3a+b: Hierarchical grouping structure (1960 – 1984 and 1985 – 2014) 
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In the second period, however, the country group pattern corresponds more closely to both 
regional proximity and the level of development. While the division between the bulk of the 
IEs, on the one hand, and the EMs and DEs, on the other hand, is most visible at the two-
cluster-level, at least most of the (African) DEs are clustered together into a further sub-
group, separated clearly from 18 out of 24 EMs on the right side of the dendrogram. Regional 
linkages are found to exist with increasing accuracy downwards from the five-cluster level, 
where the clusters can roughly be labelled as the following: 1. Cluster: ‘Central Europe’; 2. 
Cluster: ‘Anglo-Saxon’; 3. Cluster: ‘Africa’; 4. Cluster: ‘Latin America’, 5. Cluster: 
‘Southeast Asia’. However the Anglo-Saxon cluster confirms some inter-regional similarities 
in the business cycles. This is also true for Japan and Taiwan, which are grouped together 
with the Central European countries.  
What does this change in the group pattern of business cycles suggest about the previously 
detected growing importance of intra-group factors and declining relevance of the global 
factor over time? While it certainly indicates some development-related fragmentation and 
regionalization of the world’s economic system after the mid-1980s, the ‘decoupling’ of 
country groups is likely to have occurred in a slightly different constellation than between the 
IEs, EMs or some specific regional clusters. While these country groups, indeed, have 
developed increasing ties in the second period, this does not necessarily mean that intra-group 
factors exhibited lower importance for such countries before. In fact, the groups were just 
different. Taking the data-based group structures in both periods instead will give us some 
indication of to what extent the group-specific factors’ relative importance has actually 
changed. In combination with the optimal number of clusters shown in Table A2 in the 
Appendix, we can run the DFM for each period separately in order to verify the respective 
changes in the variance decompositions.  
Table 2 depicts the variance decompositions for both sub-periods with varying country group 
specifications. In line with the ‘decoupling’ thesis, we find that the global factor’s importance 
decreases for all countries and variables from the first to the second period (except for some 
countries’ investment activity) regardless of what groups have been imposed. Whereas it 
explained, on average, up to 14.7% of the volatility of output, consumption, and investment 
growth in the pre-globalization era respectively, it captures at maximum 9% of the 
macroeconomic fluctuations in the second period within all model specifications. When the 
group-specific factors are modelled according to the clustering, the importance of the global 
factor is again the lowest compared with the results from the other groupings in both periods. 
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In the pre-globalization period, however, these deviations in the global factor’s importance, 
on average, are not very high between the models, suggesting again that distinct international 
country groups around the world did not play the same role as in the second period.  
Conversely, the group-specific factors gain importance over time in all specifications with the 
highest relevance generally found again for the four and five clusters imposed. Different from 
the first two models, the group-specific factors of the four-cluster-model already exhibit 
almost equal importance as the global factor for output growth in the pre-globalization period. 
For countries like the USA and Canada the group factor already played a greater role. 
Consequently, another substantial deviation exists in the extent to which the importance of 
intra-group factors increased for some countries depending on the model. Whereas, with the 
traditional groupings, the figures for IEs went up from 11.8% and 12.5% to 50.1% and 50.1%, 
respectively, those factors’ importance has ‘only’ grown from 20.7% to 54.1% based on the 
DFM using the data-based grouping. Similarly, the average importance of the group-specific 
factors for the EU-12 countries has risen with factor 4.1 and 4.3 in columns 1 and 2 (from the 
relatively low levels of 15% and 13.7% to 62.1% and 59.2%) compared with factor 2.7 in 
Column 3 (from 23.3% to 63.3%). This confirms the perception from the cluster analysis that 
the dramatically increasing importance of intra-group factors among IEs, Ems, or within 
regions highlighted in the literature is partly to be seen as a simple result of these ex ante 
groupings reflecting reality more closely in the second period.  
Table 2: Variance decompositions using different country groupings for sub periods 1960 - 
1984 and 1985 - 2014  
4. Conclusion 
The literature on international business cycles has frequently employed DFM presuming the 
existence of group-specific factors among countries of the same region or at the same level of 
development. In the present paper, by contrast, we first reveal the data-inherent country group 
pattern of international business cycles using a cluster analysis and then estimate a DFM 
accordingly. By comparing the findings with those obtained with the traditional groupings, we 
show that the correctly specified group factors exhibit much greater, and the global factor 
much lower, importance for domestic business cycles. The deviations are particularly strong 
for countries like the USA and Canada that were previously either grouped with Mexico on a 
regional basis or with all other IEs of the sample. If we assume seven clusters instead of seven 
world regions, the cluster analysis rather provides evidence of a specific Anglo-Saxon 
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business cycle cluster comprising also the UK, Ireland, Australia, New Zealand, and some 
Northern European countries. 
Regarding the change over time, we find that the country group pattern has evolved towards 
greater development-related fragmentation and regionalization in the globalization era, 
explaining to some extent the alleged ‘decoupling’ of IEs and EMs, i.e. the growing relevance 
of the respective group factors and the decreasing importance of the global factor. The group-
specific factors of these countries, however, have played a significant role in the pre-
globalization era, too, albeit in another constellation.  
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di
ffe
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n
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nt
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 g
ro
u
pi
ng
s f
or 
su
b 
pe
rio
ds
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 - 
19
84
 a
nd
 1
98
5 
-
 
20
14
 
 
N
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: 
W
ith
in
 
ea
ch
 
pe
rio
d,
 
w
e 
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tim
at
e 
th
e 
D
FM
 u
sin
g 
gr
o
u
p-
sp
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ifi
c 
fa
ct
or
s 
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n
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ic
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io
n
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en
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io
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,
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tm
en
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l t
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f i
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te
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ifi
c).
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). 
N
ot
e 
th
at
, f
o
r 
th
e 
fir
st
 
pe
rio
d 
(19
60
-
19
84
), w
e 
as
su
m
e 
4 
cl
us
te
rs
,
 
w
hi
le
 fo
r 
th
e 
se
co
n
d 
pe
rio
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), 5
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us
te
rs
 
ar
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im
po
se
d.
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Appendix 
Table A1: List of countries and attribution to groups 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
No. Country ISO code Development level World Region No. Country ISO code Development level World Region
1 Algeria DZA Developing Economy MENA 54 Jamaica JAM Developing Economy LAC
2 Argentina ARG Emerging Market LAC 55 Japan JPN Industrialized Economy Asia
3 Australia AUS Industrialized Economy Oceania 56 Jordan JOR Emerging Market MENA
4 Austria AUT Industrialized Economy Europe 57 Kenya KEN Developing Economy SSA
5 Bangladesh BGD Developing Economy Asia 58 Lesotho LSO Developing Economy SSA
6 Barbados BRB Developing Economy LAC 59 Luxembourg LUX Industrialized Economy Europe
7 Belgium BEL Industrialized Economy Europe 60 Madagascar MDG Developing Economy SSA
8 Benin BEN Developing Economy SSA 61 Malawi MWI Developing Economy SSA
9 Bolivia BOL Developing Economy LAC 62 Malaysia MYS Emerging Market Asia
10 Botswana BWA Developing Economy SSA 63 Mali MLI Developing Economy SSA
11 Brazil BRA Emerging Market LAC 64 Mauritania MRT Developing Economy SSA
12 Burkina Faso BFA Developing Economy SSA 65 Mauritius MUS Developing Economy SSA
13 Burundi BDI Developing Economy SSA 66 Mexico MEX Emerging Market NA
14 Cameroon CMR Developing Economy SSA 67 Morocco MAR Emerging Market MENA
15 Canada CAN Industrialized Economy NA 68 Mozambique MOZ Developing Economy SSA
16 Cape Verde CPV Developing Economy SSA 69 Nepal NPL Developing Economy Asia
17 Chad TCD Developing Economy SSA 70 Netherlands NLD Industrialized Economy Europe
18 Chile CHL Emerging Market LAC 71 New Zealand NZL Industrialized Economy Oceania
19 China CHN Emerging Market Asia 72 Nicaragua NIC Developing Economy LAC
20 Colombia COL Emerging Market LAC 73 Niger NER Developing Economy SSA
21 Comoros COM Developing Economy SSA 74 Nigeria NGA Developing Economy SSA
22 Congo - Brazzaville COG Developing Economy SSA 75 Norway NOR Industrialized Economy Europe
23 Congo - Kinshasa COD Developing Economy SSA 76 Pakistan PAK Emerging Market Asia
24 Costa Rica CRI Developing Economy LAC 77 Panama PAN Developing Economy LAC
25 Denmark DNK Industrialized Economy Europe 78 Paraguay PRY Developing Economy LAC
26 Dominican Republic DOM Developing Economy LAC 79 Peru PER Emerging Market LAC
27 Ecuador ECU Developing Economy LAC 80 Philippines PHL Emerging Market Asia
28 Egypt EGY Emerging Market MENA 81 Portugal PRT Industrialized Economy Europe
29 El Salvador SLV Developing Economy LAC 82 Rwanda RWA Developing Economy SSA
30 Equatorial Guinea GNQ Developing Economy SSA 83 Senegal SEN Developing Economy SSA
31 Ethiopia ETH Developing Economy SSA 84 Seychelles SYC Developing Economy SSA
32 Finland FIN Industrialized Economy Europe 85 Singapore SGP Emerging Market Asia
33 France FRA Industrialized Economy Europe 86 South Africa ZAF Emerging Market SSA
34 Gabon GAB Developing Economy SSA 87 South Korea KOR Emerging Market Asia
35 Gambia GMB Developing Economy SSA 88 Spain ESP Industrialized Economy Europe
36 Germany DEU Industrialized Economy Europe 89 Sri Lanka LKA Developing Economy Asia
37 Ghana GHA Developing Economy SSA 90 Sweden SWE Industrialized Economy Europe
38 Greece GRC Industrialized Economy Europe 91 Switzerland CHE Industrialized Economy Europe
39 Guatemala GTM Developing Economy LAC 92 Syria SYR Developing Economy MENA
40 Guinea GIN Developing Economy SSA 93 Taiwan TWN Emerging Market Asia
41 Guinea-Bissau GNB Developing Economy SSA 94 Tanzania TZA Developing Economy SSA
42 Guyana GUY Developing Economy LAC 95 Thailand THA Emerging Market Asia
43 Haiti HTI Developing Economy LAC 96 Togo TGO Developing Economy SSA
44 Honduras HND Developing Economy LAC 97 Trinidad and Tobago TTO Developing Economy LAC
45 Hong Kong HKG Emerging Market Asia 98 Tunisia TUN Developing Economy MENA
46 Iceland ISL Industrialized Economy Europe 99 Turkey TUR Emerging Market Europe
47 India IND Emerging Market Asia 100 Uganda UGA Developing Economy SSA
48 Indonesia IDN Emerging Market Asia 101 United Kingdom GBR Industrialized Economy Europe
49 Iran IRN Developing Economy MENA 102 United States USA Industrialized Economy NA
50 Ireland IRL Industrialized Economy Europe 103 Uruguay URY Developing Economy LAC
51 Israel ISR Emerging Market MENA 104 Venezuela VEN Emerging Market LAC
52 Italy ITA Industrialized Economy Europe 105 Zambia ZMB Developing Economy SSA
53 Ivory Coast CIV Developing Economy SSA 106 Zimbabwe ZWE Developing Economy SSA
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion  
Over the past decade, the European economies have witnessed unprecedented economic and 
financial turmoil deeply connected with the setup of EMU. Following the inception of the Euro 
in 1999, the former weak currency countries in Europe’s southern periphery attracted large 
capital inflows that fostered domestic growth and employment, but also led to substantial debt 
accumulation, real appreciation, and current account deficits. These developments had thus 
been accompanied by a loss of competitiveness relative to the Central European core countries, 
which could no longer be adjusted with an exchange rate mechanism. When the global financial 
and economic crisis hit Europe in 2008/09, the deficit countries were confronted with drastic 
internal and external demand compressions followed by a sudden stop in capital inflows. Hence, 
the rapidly increasing recapitalization costs and public deficits, the troubled private sectors and 
a poor economic outlook all together provoked fears of contagious sovereign bankruptcies that 
required immediate policy action from both the EU and the ECB. But as Europe was largely 
unprepared and, above all, unwilling to reverse the Euro project, the GIIPS countries were 
supposed to undergo the painful path of structural change, internal devaluation, and austerity in 
exchange for massive financial assistance. As a consequence, the southern periphery suffered 
from prolonged economic hardship, while the faster recovering core countries struggled with 
the implications of their solidarity. This antagonism of the ‘euro crisis’ well reflects an 
uncomfortable truth shaking the foundations of an ever-closer European integration: The 
introduction of a common currency in differently developed and suitable sets of countries has 
not yet resulted in an automatic overall convergence towards an OCA, but rather enabled the 
emergence and persistence of macroeconomic imbalances in and between such country groups.  
On the other hand, the Eastern European periphery did experience a quite similar development 
over the Euro’s first decade, but most of the CEECs have maintained individual currencies 
throughout the crisis of 2008/09 and partly until today. In fact, the length and depth of the 
recessions varied substantially across the CEECs but did evolve very differently from the 
southern periphery. However, as no country resigned from the Euro, but conversely, all 
remaining EU member states are still obliged to enter the EA sooner or later, the persistence of 
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the core-periphery pattern of macroeconomic developments will most likely continue to impair 
the smooth functioning of EMU. 
The present dissertation aimed at highlighting such group-dynamic con- and divergences 
among European economies based on macroeconomic parameters in order to enable group-
specific and national policy advice. To this end, the research articles of Chapters 2 to 4 use 
diverse statistical and econometric methods as well as variables suitable for assessing the 
functioning of a monetary union. Chapter 2 follows a multivariate framework using the MIP 
scoreboard of indicators to cluster European economies in terms of external balances, 
competitiveness, indebtedness, and economic performance. The country group pattern of 
European business cycles based on univariate output gap series is assessed in Chapter 3. And, 
finally, Chapter 4 looks at multivariate European business cycles in a worldwide country sample 
that allows for disentangling the European co-movements from those at a global level.  
While each of the articles thereby provides a distinct contribution to the economic literature, 
the three approaches are related in a sense that they all address a limitation of empirical 
assessments, namely the arbitrary ex-ante definition of country groups. For example, the vast 
literature assessing the relation of the European core and periphery typically either assigns each 
country to these groups beforehand or affiliates the member states according to their 
synchronicities with an ex-ante chosen reference group or country. Similarly, the literature on 
international business cycles applies large-scale dynamic factor models, in which the group-
specific factors are common to a set of ex-ante classified countries that do not necessarily 
exhibit commonalities in their time series. Nonetheless, providing empirical evidence of the 
country groups present in the data should be the basis, when deriving conclusions about group-
specific developments. By doing so, Chapters 2 to 4 show that there indeed exist deviations 
between the data-based group compositions and those that have been previously assumed. 
Hence, the research contributions are meant to enhance our understanding of the con- and 
divergences of individual countries and whole groups.   
The main findings can be summarized as follows. Overall, macroeconomic developments 
within Europe are subject to several group-dynamic homogeneities roughly referring to a 
Central European core, a Southern European periphery, an Eastern European periphery, and 
eventually a Northern European periphery, depending on the indicators used. These borders are, 
however, neither static nor clear-cut. On the one hand, many of the countries should not be seen 
as absolute members of any singular country group, but rather exhibiting a relative degree of 
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similarity with all clusters. By applying fuzzy clustering approaches, some countries indeed 
cluster together very closely, whereas others fall right between the groups. On the other hand, 
as the characteristic macroeconomic features change with time, so does the relative assignment 
of individual countries and the composition of groups. While parts of the southern periphery, 
for instance, followed a distinct path already before the crisis of 2008/09 and even more so 
thereafter, parts of the eastern periphery began to converge towards the relatively persistent 
core cluster. As a consequence, in some specifications, countries like Italy or particular CEECs 
cannot be attributed clearly to their geographic groups but rather show a relatively high degree 
of belongingness to both groups, if not approaching the core cluster. Moreover, by using 
different business cycle data and including a global set of countries, the fourth Chapter suggests 
the existence of an ‘Anglo-Saxon’ business cycle cluster comprising countries at the geographic 
Northern European periphery as opposed to the remaining Southern and Central European 
economies. 
What can be concluded from these group dynamics? The highlighted heterogeneity or even 
divergence of core and peripheral countries certainly is an explosive charge for the future EMU, 
which may be hard or, as some say, impossible to defuse without (re)establishing individual or 
group-specific European currencies. This is because the economic needs of a particular sub-
group cannot be addressed by a common monetary policy so that a high degree of homogeneity 
among all Euro countries remains a prerequisite for a ‘one size fits all’ monetary union. 
Similarly, if the participating countries’ private and public indebtedness and the way that credits 
are spent (e.g., in housing markets) substantially differ between the groups, this can induce 
problems of financial stability. One possible solution to the diverse macroeconomic 
developments the analysis has shown is the introduction of several currency areas 
corresponding to the identified country clusters. Within each of the peripheral groups and the 
core, a separate monetary policy would be able to affect all countries equally well. For example, 
while the southern periphery may indeed require low interest rates and a weaker currency, the 
opposite would suite many core countries. However, as the group assignments are to some 
degree dynamic and the switching costs supposedly immense, this appears not to be a feasible 
way either politically or economically.  
If, on the other hand, all countries are to stay committed to the Euro, achieving macroeconomic 
homogeneity over the medium and long-run will come at high economic costs and imply 
transitory divergence of many relevant parameters, at least for the southern peripheral Euro 
countries. Because, in that case, the GIIPS countries have to mitigate the discrepancies in 
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competitiveness and indebtedness by internal devaluation of prices and wages, deleveraging 
from the high debt burden, and structural change of the economy and institutions. These 
adjustments, however, have so far been accompanied by sharp output compression and high 
unemployment rates, resulting in the observed diverging pattern after the crisis of 2008/09. 
Moreover, real exchange rates would have to evolve in the opposite direction in the core and 
southern periphery for quite some time, as the latter group would have to reverse its significant 
real appreciation over the Euro’s first decade. If, for instance, inflation rates should thereby 
remain positive and average at the envisaged two percent, this would require the core countries 
to inflate more and the periphery to inflate less than that. Obviously, such a scenario is not what 
the core countries would appreciate, but nonetheless point to the need of enhancing economic 
policy coordination within EMU. Many of the reforms undertaken in this direction, however, 
imply a highly controversial closer political integration and even a ‘transfer union,’ which might 
over the long run bring along greater economic homogeneity, but at the cost of general 
agreement with the EU. Ultimately, it is thus not only the economic convergence but also the 
European social and political cohesion that will determine the future of EMU. 
Some conclusions can be drawn for individual countries, too. Despite the widespread negative 
attitude towards supra-national politics that came to light in the recent Italian elections, the 
country exhibits a high degree of similarly with the core countries, at least with regard to 
cyclical factors and compared to the other GIIPS. This would not speak in favor of leaving the 
EA or even the EU for supposedly inappropriate polices. In line with the literature, on the side 
of the CEECs, Hungary is the closest to the core group both in terms of the MIP indicators as 
well as business cycle synchronization, suggesting that membership in the EA would be less 
costly than for other CEECs. The same is true for the EA-outs or EU-outs Denmark, Sweden, 
the UK, and Switzerland, which would generally fit well into the Euro-suitable core group of 
countries, even though there is certainly more involved in the membership decision. That said, 
it is remarkable, on the other hand, that these countries have so far been the most skeptical 
against the Euro or the EU. As such negative attitudes have resulted in the apparently 
irreversible ‘Brexit’ decision, in fact, none of these countries appear ready to review their 
reluctance in the near future. Interestingly, this is somehow supported by the third Chapter 
finding a northern periphery in terms of business cycle fluctuations, which appears quite 
contrary to the first articles but based on different indicators and a much longer time horizon. 
For Ireland, having been a member of both the GIIPS and the Anglo-Saxon business cycle 
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cluster, but recently experiencing an impressive idiosyncratic growth performance, implies 
problems with the appropriateness of the ECB monetary policy.  
Overall, the dissertation has shown that the EU is far from what may be judged as a homogenous 
European economy needed for a single currency. It remains to be seen whether and how the 
convergence of income levels among the Southern, Eastern, and Central European euro 
countries can be achieved without undermining the stability and efficiency of the common 
monetary union. Empirical research can make use of the approaches employed in this 
dissertation to update the progress that has been made and the adjustments to work on.  
Promotionsstudiengang "Wirtschaftswissenschaften" 
Versicherung bei Zulassung zur Promotionsprüfung 
 
 
Ich versichere, 
 
 
1. dass ich die eingereichte Dissertation "Convergence or Divergence in the EMU?" 
selbstständig angefertigt habe und nicht die Hilfe Dritter in einer dem Prüfungsrecht und 
wissenschaftlicher Redlichkeit widersprechenden Weise in Anspruch genommen habe, 
 
2. dass ich das Prüfungsrecht einschließlich der wissenschaftlichen Redlichkeit – hierzu 
gehört die strikte Beachtung des Zitiergebots, so dass die Übernahme fremden 
Gedankenguts in der Dissertation deutlich gekennzeichnet ist – beachtet habe, 
 
3. dass beim vorliegenden Promotionsverfahren kein Vermittler gegen Entgelt 
eingeschaltet worden ist sowie im Zusammenhang mit dem Promotionsverfahren und 
seiner Vorbereitung 
 
 kein Entgelt gezahlt oder entgeltgleiche Leistungen erbracht worden sind 
 keine Dienste unentgeltlich in Anspruch genommen wurden, die dem Sinn und 
Zweck eines Prüfungsverfahrens widersprechen 
 
4. dass ich eine entsprechende Promotion nicht anderweitig beantragt und hierbei die 
eingereichte Dissertation oder Teile daraus vorgelegt habe. 
 
 
Mir ist bekannt, dass Unwahrheiten hinsichtlich der vorstehenden Versicherung die Zulassung 
zur Promotionsprüfung ausschließen und im Falle eines späteren Bekanntwerdens die 
Promotionsprüfung für ungültig erklärt werden oder der Doktorgrad aberkannt werden kann. 
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